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Does specific rhetoric from leaders have a direct impact on influencing others?  In 
their 2007 essay “Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms”, Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick 
Thaddeus Jackson introduce a matrix which classifies the outcome of a political 
rhetorical campaign as either Policy Change, Mixed, Implications Contest, or Framing 
Contest.  The matrix measures the rhetorical arguments of a Claimant (C) against the 
response of the Opposition (O), particularly when played out in front of the Public (P).   
Using three distinct case studies, the applicability and utility of their matrix is 
tested against a number of different types of scenarios.  Case Study 1 applies the matrix 
to President Ronald Reagan’s State of the Union Addresses where he attempts to bring 
the American public around to his new policy of “rollback”.  Case Study 2 analyses the 
differences between protest rhetoric in 1988-89 Poland and 2011 Tunisia to determine if 
certain types of protest rhetoric are more persuasive than others.  Finally the third Case 
Study applies the matrix to rhetoric between Georgia and Russia in the months leading up 
to the 2008 war, to determine if Georgia is able to successfully persuade Russia to change 
their policy when publically shamed. 
Each Case Study produced a different result, however the real question is whether 
the Krebs-Jackson formula is a successful measure of C’s rhetoric when attempting to 
influence O.  It was determined that while it can be difficult to pinpoint the correlation or 
causation between C’s rhetoric and O’s response, the formula is an exceptionally useful 
tool to organize and clarify obscure political rhetoric.   
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Author Nathaniel Hawthorne once said of the power of speech: "Words – so 
innocent and powerless as they are, as standing in a dictionary, how potent for good and 
evil they become, in the hands of one who knows how to combine them!"  No truer 
statement could be made about the power of political speech, where words are often all a 
political figure has to convince his or her constituency. Words can cause changes of 
heart, of mind, or of history, and politicians have long since learned how to wield the 
power of rhetoric to turn the tables in their favor.   
It can be difficult, though, to measure the impact of those words against the 
outcome.  For all the bravado displayed by political actors – whether grassroots groups or 
politicians themselves – is there enough in the rhetoric to cause genuine persuasion?  
Should political groups spend valuable time and resources manipulating their speeches 
and cherry-picking verbiage?  Looking at the rhetoric alone is not enough to tell; the 
result is determined by whether or not the target audience (known in this essay as the 
Opposition) succumbs to the deeper intentions of the political actor (referred to as a 
Claimant).  Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson introduced those terms in 
their 2007 article “Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms”, and the matrix which resulted 
from their work is used as the foundation of the three case studies analyzed in this essay.   
The case studies in this thesis explore the power of words over a particular 
audience and will use the Krebs-Jackson model in three different ways to measure the 
impact of that rhetoric. Chapter One presents a ‘Top-Down’ case study, rhetorical 
influence from the government to the people, in which public opinion is measured against 




determine whether or not the American people reacted favorably or unfavorably toward 
the Soviet Union based on how leadership chose to portray them, and the Krebs-Jackson 
formula serves as a tool to decipher the ups and downs in public opinion.    
Chapter Two looks at rhetorical influence in the converse: from the people to the 
government, or ‘Bottom-Up’.  The world has seen at least two instances of “pan-
revolution” where grassroots protests in one country create a domino effect around the 
region: the 1989 Fall of Communism and the 2011 Arab Spring.   Poland and Tunisia 
were the two nations to initiate their respective “pan-revolution”, and this case study 
applies the Krebs-Jackson matrix to the rhetoric used in each country to determine if 
certain types of rhetoric are more effective in protest settings. 
And finally, the third case study in Chapter Three explores the use of rhetoric 
from one country to intimidate another country, ‘Peer-to-Peer’, examining the rhetoric 
flung back and forth between Georgia and Russia in the months leading up to the Russia-
Georgia War in August 2008.  In this case, Georgia goes head to head with its former 
Soviet controller in a rhetorical battle that plays out on the world stage.  The success or 
failure of Georgia’s rhetorical battle is measured by the response from Moscow, and in a 
peripheral manner, the attentions of the Western world. 
This essay ultimately seeks to answer two questions: first, was C successful in 
effecting policy change by persuading O through rhetoric? And second, is the Krebs-
Jackson formula an appropriate metric by which to measure this success?  Since each 
case study is quite distinct, the Krebs-Jackson formula can be seen in a wide variety of 




allows the readers to see how the tool can extract conclusions from each case study which 





PREVIOUS STUDIES IN POLITICAL RHETORIC 
Political Persuasion 
The idea of using particular rhetoric as an influential political tool is not a novel 
concept, yet very few scholarly works explore the notion in depth.  Peter Burnell and 
Andrew Reeve set a baseline for political persuasion in 1984 with their work “Persuasion 
as a Political Concept”.  They assert that persuasion can be separated from other, less 
savory forms of influence (manipulation, coercion, indoctrination, etc.) by a condition of 
“good faith”, and that persuasion can be an extraordinarily useful tool in the political 
realm when applied properly1.    
One common school of thought asserts that messaging from the political “elites” 
has significant impact on how the general public perceives various issues, simply by 
virtue of coming from leadership.2  Donald Searing takes that argument a step further, 
asserting that political elites possess “political authority”, a dynamic in which people 
hold a sort of reverent respect for political elites, which “predisposes followers to accept 
guidance from leaders who leave coercive power in the background and concentrate 
instead on the desires and beliefs that can produce willing compliance”.3   
                                                 
 
1 Peter Burnell and Andrew Reeve, “Persuasion as a Political Concept,” British Journal of Political Science 
14 (1984). 
2 Elmer Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America, (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960); Michael Cobb and James Kuklinski, “Changing Minds: Political 
Arguments and Political Persuasion,” American Journal of Political Science 41 (1997); John Sanders, 
"Political Authority," The Monist 66 (1983). 
3 Donald Searing, “The Psychology of Political Authority: A Causal Mechanism of Political Learning 




Within the realm of political persuasion, the changing tides of public opinion play 
a significant role.  In the most general sense, a Claimant needs to be able to sway the 
masses in order to bring public opinion around to his way of thinking and ultimately act 
as a driving force against the Opposition.  However, many subscribe to the argument that 
it is not the political leaders who can manipulate opinion, but rather the media has the 
most sweeping effect on how political messages resonate with the citizenry.4   On the 
other hand, numerous works speculate that this sought-after public opinion can actually 
severely limit a political agenda because winning public favor can be difficult.5   Of 
course, there is also a difference between opinions of domestic policy and foreign policy; 
public interest in foreign policy initiatives tends to decline quickly as time progresses and 
citizens shift their focus to issues closer to home, leaving political leadership with a 
disgruntled nation and no good way out.  Each of these articles broadly describes the 
impact of presidential speech on public opinion, but fails to delve further into the 
rhetorical minutiae which can have a large effect on how the public receives and 
internalizes political messaging. 
                                                 
 
4 Matthew Baum and Phillip Potter, “The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion and Foreign 
Policy: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis,” Annual Review of Political Science (2008); Diana Mutz and Joe 
Soss, “Reading Public Opinion: The Influence of News Coverage on Perceptions of Public Sentiment,” 
Public Opinion Quarterly (1997); Matthew McCombs and Donald Shaw, "The Agenda Setting Function of 
Mass Media,” Public Opinion Quarterly, (1972); Garry Young and William Perkins, “Presidential rhetoric, 
the public agenda, and the end of presidential television's ‘golden age’,”Journal of Politics 67 (2005). 
5 Brandon Rottinghaus, “Presidential Leadership on Foreign Policy, Opinion Polling and the Possible 
Limits of ‘Crafted Talk’,” Political Communication (2008); Wynton C. Hall, "The Invention of 
'Quantifiably Safe Rhetoric': Richard Wirthlin and Ronald Reagan's Instrumental Use of Public Opinion 
Research in Presidential Discourse,” Western Journal of Communication, (2002); Matthew Baum, "Going 
Private: Public Opinion, Presidential Rhetoric, and the Domestic Politics of Audience Costs in US Foreign 
Policy Crises,” Journal of Conflict Resolution (2004); L.R. Jacobs and R.Y. Shapiro, Politicians don't 






 Framing, or the way by which an argument is constructed and presented to the 
target audience, is one of the most common devices employed for persuasive or coercive 
methods.  It is a simple device that is used by almost every person every day without 
thinking; when a child wants his parent to purchase a new toy, the child might employ a 
“framing” technique to highlight the toy’s educational value and insist that the toy will 
improve his skills in some manner, attempting to construct that toy as a necessary tool in 
the mind of his parents, rather than just another piece of plastic collecting dust in a closet.  
There are a number of renowned scholars who have written about framing effects and a 
plethora who have applied framing in the context of influencing opinion.6  Druckman 
explains that there are a number of subcategories of framing, with equivalency framing 
and emphasis framing being the two most prevalent in political communications.7  Much 
like the scholars of political persuasion, Druckman also agrees that framing is a device 
best employed by the “elites”.8   
However, for the purposes of this essay the most applicable definition of framing 
comes from Cappella & Jamieson who said “A general definition of framing seems to 
                                                 
 
6 Erving Goffman, Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1974); Shanto Iyengar, Is Anyone Responsible?: How Television Frames Political Issues, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); William Dorman and Steven Livingston, “News and 
historical content.” The Media, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War (1994); William A. 
Gamson, Talking politics, (Cambridge University Press, 1992); William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani, 
"Media discourse and public opinion on nuclear power: A constructionist approach." American Journal of 
Sociology (1989); Todd Gitlin, The whole world is watching: Mass media in the making & unmaking of the 
new left. (University of California Press, 1980); Thomas Nelson and Donald Kinder, "Issue frames and 
group-centrism in American public opinion,” The Journal of Politics 58 (1996). 






reduce to ‘the way the story is written or produced,’ including the orienting headlines, the 
specific words choices, the rhetorical devices employed, the narrative form, and so on.”9  
Further supporting this definition, Nelson points out that when utilizing framing, the 
speaker cannot present new ideas to his audience; rather “frames operate by activating 
information already at the recipients' disposal, stored in long-term memory”.10  This 
makes logical sense in terms of a persuasive mechanism.  A speaker draws on what his 
audience thinks they already believe about a particular issue and forces the audience to 
reassess their beliefs using the terms dictated by the speaker.     
Rhetoric 
From the extensive research above, it is evident that persuasion and frame 
analysis are certainly critical components to any kind of influential speech.  But what 
about the actual words themselves?  Some literature explores rhetoric in a substantive 
context, describing a change in opinion based on the overall content of the speech rather 
than the adjectives or phrases used.  Jeffrey Cohen theorizes that the more time a 
president spends on foreign policy in his State of the Union address, the more the public 
will pay attention to those specific issues mentioned.11  
When literature does review the influential effects of language, the focus rests 
largely on events within the past decade, primarily in the context of war or other military 
                                                 
 
9 Joseph Cappella and Kathleen Jamieson, Spiral of Cynicism: The Press and the Public Good (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1997): 39. 
10 Thomas Nelson, Zoe M. Oxley and Rosalee A. Clawson, “Toward a Psychology of Framing Effects”, 
Political Behavior 19, (1997): 225. 





engagements.  In one such article, titled “Rhetoric of Bush Speeches: Purr Words and 
Snarl Words”, Hoffmann argues that President Bush ‘manipulated’ the public into 
believing the Iraq War was a just cause. In their analysis of Bush rhetoric before Iraq, 
Gershkoff and Kushner make a similar case about policy framing: “The Bush 
administration successfully framed the war in Iraq as an extension of its response to 
September 11 and the war on terror.  The administration juxtaposed allusions to Iraq with 
the terms terror, bin Laden, and al Qaeda.” 12   Both authors make the case that 
semantics and repeated use of ‘key terms’ helped convince the American people to 
support a second theater of war, but there is no conclusive evidence to support their 
claim. 
There are examples of academic work that focus more broadly on the topic of 
presidential speech in changing the way Americans perceive nations, though these works 
tend to center around specific events rather than the effect of speech itself.13   For 
example, in her analysis of President Nixon’s speeches during the opening to China in 
1972, Michelle Yang highlights the fact that Nixon had to choose his words with great 
care to appease both a wary American public and a proud Chinese society. Flanagan’s 
work studies the change in President Wilson’s rhetoric regarding Germany in the years 
leading up to the First World War, noting that the formerly isolationist president, who 
originally “did not discriminate between the belligerents”, was forced to “implicitly 
                                                 
 
12 Amy Gershkoff and Shauna Kushner, “Shaping Public Opinion: The 9/11-Iraq Connection in the Bush 
Administration's Rhetoric,” Perspectives on Politics, September (2005): 526. 
13 Michelle Yang, "President Nixon’s Speeches and Toasts During His 1972 Trip to China:A Study in 
Diplomatic Rhetoric." Rhetoric & Public Affairs (2011); Jason Flanagan, “Woodrow Wilson's "Rhetorical 
Restructuring": The Transformation of the American Self and the Construction of the German Enemy,” 




redefine the German government as an enemy of both the United States and mankind”, 
initiating a style of rhetorical framing which would carry on through future presidents.14 
In terms of protest rhetoric, there is little research that explores that actual words 
used by protest groups.  Much research has been done on the social psychology of “group 
think” and social movement theory in the broad sense.15  Social movement theory is then 
combined with elements of protest rhetoric.  For example, scholars have noted that social 
movement leaders tend to use ‘themes’.  In 1969, Scott and Smith described the theme of 
“haves and have-nots” in both the traditional and contemporary sense.  He argues that the 
rhetoric of this most basic line of division has been brought into the modern day, where 
“those on the ‘have not’ side of the division… no longer accept designation as an inert 
mass hoping to receive what they lack through action by the ‘haves.’"   In other words, 
the protest groups are beginning to take charge of their own circumstances rather than 
wait for upper class leadership to initiate changes. 
Another commonly cited theme is “ego function”, which claims that within the 
protest group, “there appears to be a strong need to recognize and proclaim that one's ego 
is somehow ignored, or damaged, or disenfranchised.”   Richard Gregg cites the Black 
Power, Women’s Liberation, and student revolution movements as examples of groups 
who play upon their downtrodden circumstances to ignite passion and provoke 
insurgence amongst their peers.  This theory is likely the closest to what caused the 
                                                 
 
14 Flanagan (2004): 138. 
15 Herbert W. Simons, “Requirements, Problems, and Strategies: A Theory of Persuasion for Social 
Movements”, The Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 61, no. 1 (1970): 3-4.; Charles Tilly, “Social 
Movements, 1768–2004”, (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2004); John D McCarthy and Mayer Zald, 
"Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory”, American Journal of Sociology Vol. 82, 




uprisings in both the former Soviet Union and the Middle East, as both groups were 
seriously oppressed and left without a legitimate voice in the government. 
Within protest rhetoric, the previously discussed concept of ‘framing’ is also 
evident.  McCarthy et. al. can be applied to this as well, arguing that often social 
movement participants do not realize they are caught up in a momentous wave until 
leadership figures reign in the popular feelings and construct a collective message.   They 
are then able to shape the message to fit within popular sentiment, thereby continuing to 
drive the masses.  But in each of these thematic examples, none focuses explicitly on the 
language employed by the protest groups to determine if it was successful in achieving 
their end goal. 
The Basis for this Research 
As evidenced by previous academic works, what scholars of rhetorical devices 
often fail to overlook is how the effects of specific language can influence a target 
audience.  From a semantics perspective, particular words carry particular connotations.  
When speechwriters begin crafting language to be delivered, they must literally choose 
their words carefully.  The terms hostile, aggressive, and unfriendly can all be considered 
synonyms, however it is understood that each carries a distinct tone of decreasing 
intensity.  The specific language employed indicates how the speaker intends his or her 
audience to perceive a given issue. 
Of all the existing literature discussing methods of political persuasion, only one 
piece of research comes close to addressing the root of the issue this paper seeks to 
explore.  In 2007, Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson wrote “Twisting 




what they call a model of “Rhetorical Coercion”, the basis of which argues that while 
“we cannot observe directly what people think…we can observe what they say and how 
they respond to claims and counter-claims.”16  In other words, politicians cannot 
constantly perform a psycho-analysis on their audiences to see which words best 
resonate.  Therefore, rhetoric is delivered using a frame (how C chooses to characterize 
the issue at hand) and the follow-on implications (actions which should occur based on 
the frame). Their model is hinged on the following: 
Seeking to effect change in some policy or ongoing course of 
action, a claimant (C) directs an argument toward the 
opposition (O) in view of a public (P). For the purposes of the 
model, it does not matter whether O has exclusive control over 
the actions at issue (if O is, for example, the government) or 
whether C and O share responsibility (if they are, for example, 
political parties in a legislative assembly). All that matters is 
that O’s accession or resistance is critical to the outcome.17 
 
According to Krebs & Jackson, there are four possible outcomes from this theory, 
which are outlined in Table 1.  Each outcome is based on how O responds to C’s rhetoric 
in terms of the frame and implications.  
                                                 
 
16 Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, “Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of 
Political Rhetoric,” European Journal of International Relations, (2007): 42. 
17 Krebs & Jackson (2007): 43. 
Table 1: Opposition Response and Outcomes of Rhetorical Contestation  














1. Policy Change.  In Case 1, O accepts both the frame and the implications 
of C’s argument, and policy changes accordingly.  For C, this outcome 
represents an unmitigated triumph.  
2. Mixed. In Case 2, O accepts the proposed implications and changes the 
policy, but it rejects C’s reasoning. An example would be if an 
environmental movement (C) urged the government (O) to restrict logging 
for ecological reasons, and the government agreed to restrict logging but 
justified the policy shift in economic terms. Though the movement would 
have won the substantive battle, it might reasonably perceive its victory as 
less than complete; the government might in the future expand logging 
rights on economic grounds as easily as it had earlier restricted them on 
that very basis. 
3. Implication Contest.  O accepts the terms of C’s arguments, but rejects 
the implications that C draws. For example, a lobbying group (C) may 
argue that high taxes are an unfair burden on the citizenry and should be 
reduced through an across-the-board reduction in tax rates; a political 
party (O) may agree that high taxes are problematic but suggest instead 
targeted tax cuts. As this relatively narrow policy debate occurs within a 
common issue frame, it might be termed an implication contest. 
4. Framing Contest.  Here, the two parties disagree about the very terms of 
debate as well as the policies that follow, and their rhetorical efforts 




that their political opponents will accept it (along with the concomitant 
implications).18 
The Krebs-Jackson formula is an important metric by which we can more easily 
understand the impact of rhetoric on various audiences.  Without this framework, 
individual case studies could still be analyzed and their outcomes judged according to the 
opinion of the researcher.  Adding the Krebs-Jackson formula, however, forces the 
analysis into one of four potential outcomes and codifies the information for a much more 
comprehensible and applicable result. 
Selecting the Case Studies 
Within the context of political persuasion, this essay asserts that there are three 
types of scenarios defining the Claimant-Opposition relationship: 
1. Top-Down: When the political leadership act as the Claimant and 
attempt to force change on the citizenry (Opposition).  For example, a 
President wishes to enact controversial legislation and must use 
persuasive rhetoric in order to bring the public around to his point of 
view.   
2. Bottom-Up: In this scenario, the citizenry initiates the claim and puts the 
onus of political change on the leadership (Opposition).  For example, a 
national advocacy group launches a campaign against foreign energy 
dependency, claiming that the government is supporting terrorism by 
                                                 
 




continuing to purchase oil abroad, and demands that the government ban 
purchasing oil from select nations. 
3. Peer-to-Peer: Here, politicians attempt to discredit each other, thereby 
winning the public over to one side or another.  For instance, in a 
campaign, Politician 1 may publically assert that Incumbent Politician 2 
has been corrupted by accepting money from questionable political 
groups, and is calling for voters to unseat Politician 2 in the next election. 
Though scholars have cited Krebs and Jackson’s theory in other works about 
framing and influence of rhetoric, none have actually applied their matrix to other 
scenarios.  In their own essay, Krebs and Jackson only apply the tenants of their matrix to 
one “Bottom-Up” case study in which the minority Druze Arab population in Israel (the 
Claimants) used coercive rhetoric which ultimately forced Israeli politicians (the 
Opposition) to acknowledge the Druze as equal status citizens.    
Using the logic that Krebs and Jackson have laid out, this essay will apply the 
formula to three distinctive studies of instances in recent history when one political body 
(C) used particular rhetoric to persuade their opposition (O).  By applying the formula to 
a broader range of scenarios, a more accurate assessment of the utility of the matrix can 
be assembled.   
There is always the chance that either the matrix or persuasive rhetoric do not 
have as much utility when applied to certain scenarios, and the intention of this essay is 
to apply the matrix in as many ways as possible.  The case studies were selected 
deliberately in order to provide a broad range of scenarios and achieve the most 




Down” approach, where the American President (C), uses particular rhetoric in his State 
of the Union address in an attempt to persuade the American people (O/P) to soften their 
opinion of the Soviet Union.  Case Study #2 is another kind of “Bottom-Up” approach, 
where (C) is a group of protesters using rhetoric to change the political stance of their 
governments (O) in 1989 and 2011.  Finally, Case Study #3 is a “Peer to Peer” approach, 
in which two rival governments attempt to discredit each other in the public arena and 
win the West to their side of the argument.  Here, Georgia has been selected as the 
Claimant (C), Russia as the Opposition (O), and the Western world watches as the Public 
presence (P). 
It must be acknowledged that rhetorical persuasion cannot occur in a vacuum.  In 
each of these case studies, as with any scenario, the participants carry preconceived 
opinions or are heavily influenced by the media or changing events along the way.  These 
variables are nearly impossible to control, particularly in today’s world where external 
influences are omnipresent and instantaneous.  The way in which this variable is 
accounted for differs in each case study, and is addressed further there.  It is important to 
remember, though, that this essay is more interested in the broader policy outcomes that 
come from political quorum, rather than whether or not C was able to effect personal 
doctrinal change in O.  In other words, with respect to C’s policy change demands, into 
which of the four ‘corners’ did C force O due to their successful (or unsuccessful) 
application of particular coercive rhetoric.   
By selecting three distinct case studies, as opposed to three similar ones, the 
Krebs-Jackson formula is applied in three completely different ways so as to view a 




first broken down to extract the key words and phrases which evoke strong feeling.  Then 
the Krebs-Jackson formula is applied to determine C’s success in wielding strong rhetoric 
over O.  Finally, using the formula as a measuring device, each of the scenarios can be 
ranked based on the estimated success of C’s rhetoric over O.  It is the intention that by 
analyzing the rhetoric employed in each case study and the subsequent outcome of each 
case, a clear delineation is made between the power of rhetoric and the overall influence 





CHAPTER ONE: THE RHETORIC OF FOREIGN POLICY: THE EFFECT OF 
REAGAN’S STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESSES ON AMERICAN PUBLIC 
OPINION TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION (A TOP-DOWN CASE STUDY) 
In today’s presidential reality, the opinions of the American people matter greatly 
to the success or failure of policies, particularly when it comes to foreign affairs.  Yet 
persuading the public is not an easy task, especially when faced with the 24 hour news 
cycle that can spin a president’s foreign policy agenda out of control.  Presidents are 
granted very few opportunities to speak directly to the Congress and to the American 
people about their policy objectives without additional filtering from the media.  The 
State of the Union Address, however, allows presidents one such occasion to choose their 
words carefully and shape their messages specifically to influence how Americans 
perceive policies or, in the case of this study, foreign nations. 
Since the birth of the United States, foreign nations have acted as allies, 
adversaries, and everything in between.  The relationship between the United States and 
the Soviet Union has been tumultuous and marked by decades of animosity.19  At varying 
points throughout that history, presidents needed the American public to perceive the 
Soviet Union either favorably or unfavorably, depending on what the prevailing policy 
initiatives happened to be.  In the terms of Krebs-Jackson, Presidents utilize rhetorical 
coercion in their annual State of the Union Address to subconsciously force the American 
people to think or feel differently about varying issues.  This particular case study will 
                                                 
 
19 Throughout the time period covered by this particular case study, the name of the Soviet Union 
sometimes fluctuated between some variation of ‘Russia’, ‘Soviet Russia’ or ‘Soviet Union’.  To maintain 
continuity throughout the case study, the country will always be referred to as the Soviet Union, except 




focus on President Reagan’s use of rhetoric to persuade the American public during his 
first and second Administrations. 
Rollback: The Reagan Doctrine 
 After decades of Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, 
President Reagan was the first to experience a promising thaw, leading ultimately to the 
fall of the Berlin Wall just months after Reagan left office.  Throughout his presidency, 
Reagan took a much more openly proactive – and sometimes provocative – approach to 
battling the global spread of Communism.  Most presidents before him feared any sudden 
moves which might provoke the Soviets into launching a nuclear attack, and therefore 
practiced “containment”, or an attempt to prevent further spreading of Communism.  
Reagan, however, was committed to ending the stalemate once and for all.  As early as 
four years before his election, Reagan remarked to Richard V. Allen, a man who would 
later become Reagan’s National Security Advisor, that “‘My idea of American policy 
toward the Soviet Union is simple…We win and they lose. What do you think of that?’"20  
This new mentality of challenging the Soviet Union and their doctrine head-on became 
known as “rollback”.  
 Implementing the rollback policy was one challenge, but selling the American 
people on a new era of improved relations with the Soviet Union was entirely another.  In 
the early 1980s, a sizeable portion of the population had never known life without the 
looming threat of nuclear war.  A line of presidents before Reagan had tried and thus far 
                                                 
 




failed to bring about any change; why should Reagan’s confrontational approach merit 
public support? 
This chapter analyzes the effect of President Reagan’s State of the Union 
rhetorical coercion to determine if he was able to convince the American public to view 
the Soviet Union in a different light.  In this instance, President Reagan represents the 
Claimant (C), while the American Public shares the role of Opposition (O) and public 
(P).  At the conclusion of this Case Study, the Krebs-Jackson formula is applied to 
calculate the overall outcome of the results, and to determine if President Reagan was 
indeed successful in coercing the American public into hoping for a successful rollback. 
Data Utilized 
Historical State of the Union Addresses are used as a database from which a trend 
of descriptive words and phrases is determined, while the polling data provide a way to 
gauge how (or if) the American people respond to the rhetoric.  Polling data was selected 
from Gallup, the University of Chicago’s National Opinion Research Center General 
Social Survey (NORC-GSS), and the Times Mirror, first because each of these 
organizations asked identical questions of their participants, and second because each of 
these groups offered a semi-annual survey which gives consistency to their data.21   
Through a combination of these groups a rough trend line emerged, offering consistent 
                                                 
 




data over a period of nine years, spanning some of the most critical points in US-Soviet 
relations.22   For the complete polling data and subsequent trend line, see Appendix A. 
Method of Analysis 
For the purposes of this analysis, the focus is on State of the Union Addresses 
delivered by President Ronald Reagan between 1982 and 1988.  This range of dates was 
selected for two reasons: first, those dates represent the years leading up to the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the run-up to the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a whole.  That 
particular period of time was critical in American history and represented the culmination 
of decades of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union.  Second, President 
Reagan’s legacy is largely centered on his interactions with the Soviet Union, lending 
particular credence to his words during this time.   
Each State of the Union address was combed for mentions of the Soviet Union – 
both direct and indirect – and passages believed to hold particular power or emotion were 
selected.  Table 2 below shows a count of positive, negative, and neutral references 
throughout each State of the Union Address.  Each passage was coded according to its 
general sentiment: positive (green), negative (red), or neutral (yellow).23   This provides a 
visual portrayal of the general tone of each speech.  Finally, specific words and phrases 
from each selection were bolded to emphasize those pieces which induce feeling.  For a 
color-coded visual aid, see Appendix B. 
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The analysis is based on two types of polling questions which most directly asked 
the necessary information.  First, “is your overall opinion of Russia very favorable, 
mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable, or very unfavorable?” and second, “You notice 
that the ten boxes on this card go from the highest position of plus five – for something 
you have a very favorable opinion of – to minus five – for something you have a very 
unfavorable opinion of.  Please tell me how far up the scale or how far down the scale 
you rate this nation: Russia.”24  These questions, of the many variations asked by 
different polling groups, probe for the necessary information most directly while avoiding 
as many external variables as possible. 
Why Analyze State of the Union Addresses? 
Though presidents give dozens of speeches over the course of a year, the State of 
the Union address is a highly-anticipated event marking the culmination of months of 
preparation.  And rightly so, as the State of the Union is the only time throughout the year 
when the President is constitutionally obligated to address both the Congress and the 
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Table 2: Number of Positive, Negative, and Neutral References toward the 
Soviet Union in State of the Union Addresses 
 
  1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988   
Positive 5 4 7 6 12 2 5 4 5   
Negative 45 54 5 2 0 5 5 10 0   
Neutral 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 0   




nation as a whole.  It is also the most-watched presidential event throughout the year, and 
the one time annually that the Oval Office has a captive audience.  Thus, the speech is 
carefully planned down to the last comma so as to deliver the most accurate, hard-hitting, 
and influential message possible.  That is to say, the wording selected for the State of the 
Union address is done so deliberately and with great intention.  Each descriptive word 
chosen to depict foreign nations within the State of the Union address has a specific 
message to convey, and is seeking a particular reaction from the public.   
Furthermore, in the late-20th century the barrage of 24-hour media had yet to 
permeate the American lifestyle, and only the most critical of speeches made it to the 
public (i.e., the State of the Union, statements of war, and other national crises).  To 
ensure the speeches were significant enough to reach a broad base of the American 
people, it made the most sense to analyze only State of the Union Addresses.   
Another factor to consider is unspoken messaging.  There are many instances in 
which presidents – always consummate politicians – never specifically reference rival 
nations by name.  Rather, they allude to countries which are losing favor with the United 
States by using vague terminology, lumping them into large groupings, or giving 
speeches centered on ideological themes.  In cases such as these, it is much more difficult 
to measure the actual effect of the speech on public opinion, as some people are much 
more adept at picking up on subtleties in messaging than others. 
Of course, rhetoric does not occur in a vacuum.  When Presidents speak to their 
audiences, it is within a context of both historical and current events.  In most cases, the 
populace will have a pre-formed opinion of the issue at hand.  It is then the task of the 




persuade the public to change their position or form a new opinion.  This only reinforces 
the need for the Claimant to use rhetoric that both conveys the desired message and 
influences the audience enough to change their minds.  In this particular case, the effect 
of outside influencers was kept to a minimum by analyzing polling data that was 
collected as immediately as possible after the State of the Union speech was given; as is 
seen in Appendix A, all but one of the polls were taken in January of that particular year.  
This would allow for the least amount of time for the media to offer their own 
interpretations of what the President “meant” to say, thereby acquiring the purest data 
from the polling sample. 
Setting a Baseline 
At the beginning of President Carter’s tenure in the 1970s, the Soviet Union was 
rarely mentioned in State of the Union speeches, possibly in a hope that by not 
aggravating the issue it would simply vanish.  However, after a series of historic events in 
late 1979 – principally the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran Hostage Crisis –
favorability ratings toward the Soviets were measured at 14 percent favorable and 84 
percent unfavorable.25   Subsequently, in a manner most unlike the previously dove-ish 
President Carter, the 1980 and 1981 State of the Union Addresses employ incredibly 
forceful rhetoric.  Words like ‘danger’, ‘threat’, and ‘aggression’ are used liberally 
throughout the texts.  He speaks of the Soviet ‘assault’ on Afghanistan, an “effort to 
dominate” the country, and the use of “power for colonial conquest”.  He frequently 
references the condemnation of Soviet actions by the world community, saying “a vast 
                                                 
 




majority of nations have condemned this attempt”, and “no action of world power has 
ever been so quickly condemned”.26   Within his address, President Carter either 
references or makes explicit mention of the Soviet Union in no fewer than seventeen 
paragraphs. 
During his final days as President in 1981, Jimmy Carter gave a concluding State 
of the Union Address to Congress.  Within that speech, Carter continued to use rather 
inflammatory terminology which gave the American public a sense that our tactics 
toward the Soviets had once again reverted to antagonism.  Variations on ‘aggression’ 
could be counted seven times throughout the speech, while ‘threat’ was utilized six times.  
He discussed the “destructive and aggressive policies” of the Soviets which have “added 
immeasurably to the suffering” of the people of Afghanistan.27   Carter refers to the 
Soviet ‘invasion’ no fewer than nine times, adding that it poses “the most serious threat to 
peace since World War II”.  He also emphasizes the blatant disregard for rule of law, 
noting that by occupying Afghanistan, the Soviets committed a “callous violation of 
international law”.28 
But for all that rhetoric, America softened a bit on the Soviets; unfavorable ratings 
dipped to 77 percent and favorable rose six points to 20 percent.29   President Carter 
faded into history as a passive leader, and was quickly replaced by Ronald Reagan, the 
man who changed the way America perceived the Soviet Union. 
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Rhetorical Analysis Results 
The Reagan Years: Part I 
The election of President Ronald Reagan brought an entirely different set of 
values and rhetoric to the Oval Office.  During his very first State of the Union in 1982, 
Reagan spoke less about the Soviet Union than previous presidents; when the Soviet 
Union was mentioned, a majority of the words conveyed encouragement and optimism 
for the rival nation, particularly with regard to arms negotiations.  He used words phrases 
like “already initiated negotiations” and “working for a reduction of arms” to describe the 
active nature of relations, and give the American people hope that the situation would not 
remain stagnant.30 
On the other hand, Reagan balanced his optimism with a realist sense of caution, 
reminding Americans that the Soviets were still a hostile force looking to topple US 
world influence.  The words ‘empire’ and ‘regime’ communicate a sense of repressive 
government, and he reinforces that with vivid imagery phrases, such as “we've never 
needed walls or minefields or barbed wire to keep our people in.”31   More than once he 
referenced the “unrelenting buildup” of Soviet military power, emphasizing again that 
our adversaries would not go quietly into the night. 
The 1982 polling data shows that unfavorable ratings did not move from the 
previous year, but that favorable ratings went up by 3 percent.32  I would attribute the 
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slight uptick in favorability to the newly balanced approach and Reagan’s famed slogan 
“trust but verify”.  President Reagan communicated to the American people that the 
United States was willing and able to negotiate with the Soviets, as long as we proceed 
with caution.  The American public responded with equally tentative optimism. 
The year 1983 was a relatively quiet one in US-Soviet relations, yet American 
public opinion of their country dropped to 15 percent favorable and spiked to 83 percent 
unfavorable.33   The death of Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev and subsequent 
installation of Yuri Andropov, should have commanded a sense of optimism given the 
new leadership and chance for a fresh start.  Still, President Reagan held firm in his 
balanced approach to describing the Soviet Union to the American people.   
His 1983 State of the Union Address offered both encouraging and tentative 
descriptions of the Soviets.  President Reagan began with many positive references, using 
terms like “strategy for peace” and “positive change in relations”, referring to the new 
leadership in the Soviet Union.34   He employed active verbs like “pursuing” to discuss 
the ongoing arms reduction negotiations, offering encouragement that a settlement might 
yet be reached.  But Reagan was also careful to maintain the upper hand, using words like 
“threaten” and “invade”, “overwhelming evidence” and “violation” to describe some of 
the shortfalls of the Soviet government.35   Unfortunately, the stunning drop in public 
opinion does not seem to match up with the relatively steady rhetoric utilized by 
President Reagan that year. 
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The year 1984 saw perhaps the most positive message delivered about the Soviet 
Union since they were allied with the United States in World War II.  President Reagan 
had nothing but optimistic, encouraging words about the Soviets throughout the whole of 
his State of the Union speech, beginning with “a more stable basis for peaceful 
relations”.36   He then went on to speak directly to the Soviet people, a tactic which had 
also had a positive effect on the American people.  President Reagan uses emotional 
phrases such as “our sons and daughters have never fought each other in war”.  He calls 
them “people of the Soviet” on multiple occasions, giving the Soviet Union a sense of 
humanity that had henceforth been disregarded.  He discusses ‘faith’ and ‘friendship’ and 
“our children’s children”, all terms which evoke commonalities between individuals.37 
For all that heartening rhetoric, there appears to be no measure of public opinion 
in the year 1984.  Based on the steadily rising trend in the surrounding years, however, 
one could infer that the American people responded favorably to Reagan’s leadership and 
optimism.  This small rise in favorability was just the beginning of a much larger change, 
for the most dramatic shift in public opinion was yet to come. 
  
The Reagan Years: Part II 
Some of the most extraordinary changes came in 1985 – the year which would 
transform the structure of the Soviet Union forever.  In what was becoming a strange sort 
of routine, Soviet President Yuri Andropov died in early 1984, was replaced by President 
Konstantin Chernenko, who also died just twelve months later.  Reagan’s 1985 State of 
                                                 
 





the Union reflected some of the uncertainty he had toward the ever-changing Soviet 
leadership.  Though he remained “committed” to determining a fair arms settlement, he 
also expressed some of the sternest rhetoric about the Soviets since taking office.  Reagan 
emphasized the constant buildup of Soviet defense systems, referring to bases for 
“Communist terrorists”, “Soviet-supported aggression” and full “Soviet-bloc support”.38   
Surprisingly though, the public responded favorably to the Soviet Union, improving 
favorability ratings to 23 percent and decreasing unfavorable ratings to 77 percent.39 
The bizarre recurring deaths of Soviet leaders led to the installation of President 
Mikhail Gorbachev, with whom President Reagan would develop a great and historic 
relationship.  The ensuing State of the Union in 1986 reflects the sincerity of that 
relationship.  For one thing, President Reagan began referring to the Soviet leadership by 
name, mentioning “Mr. Gorbachev’s upcoming visit to America”.40   Previously referred 
to as “the Soviet regime” or “the Soviet leadership”, this minor act gave added humanity 
to the Soviets that had previously been omitted.  He also describes a more “stable 
relationship” with the Soviet Union and his “hope” for the upcoming summit in Geneva.   
Despite the new changes afoot, Reagan maintains an even keel between the 
hopeful messages and constructive criticism.  He talks of Soviet “drive for domination”, 
“threats”, and “state terror”.  He describes them as a country which “exports ideology by 
force”.41   But it is clear that the American public was energized by Reagan’s evident 
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relationship with Gorbachev, and they took his words of familiarity to heart.  Favorability 
ratings made a leap to 34 percent, while the unfavorable ratings declined to 66 percent, 
the lowest they had been since 1977.42 
Any goodwill created by the relationship between Reagan and Gorbachev was 
lost on the American people just one year later, though, as favorable public opinion of the 
Soviets fell a bit in 1987; favorable ratings dropped to 25 percent while unfavorable 
ratings rose to 71 percent.43  This could be attributed to Reagan’s 1987 State of the Union 
Address, which espoused some of the most vehement rhetoric thus far in his presidency.   
Reagan makes a full reversal in his language, speaking of “brutal war”, “Soviet 
beachhead” and “Communist domination”.  He calls the Soviets a ‘regime’, and uses 
vivid imagery to describe a point at which the Soviets “sought to cripple our strategic 
defense initiative”.  It is clear that he wants the American people to not let their guard 
down when it comes to Soviet power, emphasizing their “single minded determination to 
advance their power”.  However, Reagan still maintains that sense of balance and 
optimism about the future of US-Soviet relations, using terms like “we always remain 
open”, “progress”, and “more open contacts between our societies”.44 
President Reagan’s famous “Tear Down this Wall” speech was given in June, 
1987, followed by a January 1988 State of the Union address which focused solely on the 
progress being made in the Soviet Union.  Reagan referred to Mr. Gorbachev by name 
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twice, giving emphasis to the newfound respect between the two world leaders.  He 
discussed the reduction of arms and the removal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, using 
such encompassing terms as “all troops are removed”.45  
Most would assume that the hope and determination espoused in those words 
would be enough to spark a revelation at home with regard to America’s thoughts toward 
the Soviet Union.  However, the polling data shows otherwise.  Though there is a slight 
uptick in ‘favorable’ ratings between 1987 and 1988, the ‘unfavorables’ hold perfectly 
steady at a high 71 percent.46 
Analysis of Rhetoric 
Between the years 1982 and 1988, there are some significant shifts in favorable 
vs. unfavorable opinion, yet the question is whether or not President Reagan’s rhetoric 
had a direct impact on those results.  One would generally assume that if negative 
rhetoric about the Soviet Union was more prevalent, the natural response would be an 
uptick in unfavorable ratings with a simultaneous decrease in favorable ratings.  
Conversely, an increase in positive and encouraging rhetoric should elicit improved 
favorable ratings and a drop in unfavorable.  And in fact, this is largely the trend that 
emerges. 
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 In 1982, Reagan’s negative references are almost non-existent compared to 
President Carter’s aggressive address the year before.  He also included much more 
positive rhetoric, and we see a rise in favorability ratings, but there is no substantial 
change in unfavorable ratings from the 1981 polling.  1983 saw even fewer negative 
references, but also fewer positive references from Reagan’s first State of the Union.  As 
such, favorable ratings fell along with those positive references, and the unfavorable 
ratings did see a slight uptick as well.  Conclusion: the public did respond to his positive 
remarks. 
Table 3: Increases or Decreases Compared to Numbers from the Previous 
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The year 1985 is a bit of an anomaly when, although there was an increase in 
negative rhetoric and corresponding decrease in positive rhetoric, the public opinion 
ratings did exactly the opposite.  Since there is nothing in this dataset which explains this 
anomaly, it is fair to assume that there may have been external influences at work which 
are not measured in this particular study, such as particularly negative media coverage or 
an event that is not referenced in the State of the Union speech.   
For the remainder of President Reagan’s administration, it would appear that the 
American public responded quite well to his positive rhetoric about the Soviet Union.  In 
1986, 1987, and 1988 the public favorability ratings always moved along with Reagan’s 
positive references.  Likewise, the ‘unfavorable’ ratings showed a corresponding inverse 
relationship, decreasing with more positive rhetoric and increasing or showing no change 
if there was less positive rhetoric, as is shown in Table 3 above. 
An unexpected discovery was that public opinion responded much more to the 
positive rhetoric than to the negative rhetoric, evident in the fact that the positive rhetoric 
seemed to have the most direct and correlating relationship with the public opinion 
polling results.   
Applying the Krebs-Jackson Formula 
 After analyzing the rhetoric and the subsequent public opinion polling, we can 
apply the Krebs-Jackson formula to determine the outcome.  In this case study, the Frame 
employed by President Reagan painted the Soviet Union as an adversary that was trying 
to rebuild itself as an ally.  The Implications which follow suggest that the American 
people reconsider the Soviet Union and accept the new policy of ‘rollback’.  In light of 




way the favorability ratings moved along with Reagan’s increasingly positive rhetoric, 
one can surmise that the American people (O) did accept the implications of Reagan’s 
arguments; i.e. that the relationship with the Soviet Union needed to improve.  However, 
they did not entirely accept the framing of the Soviet Union as a potential partner in the 
near future.  Had the implications also been accepted (Case 1), the favorable public 
opinion of the Soviet Union would have spiked much higher in anticipation of an  
imminent improvement in relations.   
 
In Case 2, the American people would reject the framing of the Soviet Union as a 
communist nation seeking change, but accept the Presidential implications that the United 
States could ally with the Soviets in the future.  This case is not entirely dissimilar from 
Case 3; however, the reason this is not the outcome is that over a period of analysis, the 
ratings did not experience a significant change.  The favorable ratings improved slightly, 
Table 4: Possible Results of Case Study 1 
 Accept Frame Reject Frame 
Accept Implications 
Case 1: Policy Change 
 
The American people believe 
the Soviet Union is changing 
fundamentally and support a 
new relationship through 
‘rollback’ 
 
Case 2: Mixed 
 
The American people do not 
believe the Soviet Union is 
changing fundamentally, but 




Case 3: Implication Contest 
 
The American people believe 
the Soviet Union is changing 
fundamentally but do not 
support a new relationship 
through ‘rollback’ 
 
Case 4: Framing Contest 
 
The American people do not 
believe the Soviet Union is 
changing fundamentally and  
do not support a new 





and the unfavorable ratings fell slightly – just enough to indicate a cautious optimism 
about the situation at hand.  But it is clear that the American people are not yet ready to 
embrace a fundamental shift in the world order.  Case 4 does not make much sense in this 
context either.  If the American people had rejected Presidential implications of the 
Soviet Union through his rhetoric, and also rejected his framing of the issue, favorability 
ratings would have plummeted while the unfavorable ratings soared 
Drawing Conclusions 
This first case study is revealing because it is the exact opposite of the case study 
Krebs-Jackson used in their original essay.  Rather than discuss the effects a group of 
citizens has on the government, Chapter One focuses on the way the Government might 
use rhetoric to persuade the citizenry.  We recall the two questions this essay seeks to 
answer: first, was C successful in effecting policy change by persuading O through 
rhetoric? And second, is the Krebs-Jackson formula an appropriate metric by which to 
measure this success?   
To answer question one, it is evident that through his rhetoric, Reagan was unable 
to successfully persuade the American people to reconsider Soviet foreign policy.  The 
evidence suggests that the American people – taking cues from Reagan’s firm yet 
optimistic tone – may have believed the future held some hope for a new partnership 
between the two rival nations.  Yet that hope was likely tempered by a myriad of external 
factors such as pessimistic news reporting, preconceived bias, or current events.   
However, to answer question two, perhaps the Krebs-Jackson formula is not as 
appropriate in this “Top-Down” context.  Unlike a “Bottom-Up” example like the one 




‘force’ their citizens into any decision.  At the end of the day, the Government officials 
wield the power to change policy regardless of public opinion.  By applying the formula 
to this particular case study, we are able to organize what the American public may have 
been thinking with regard to Soviet policy, and the formula did provide a fascinating lens 
through which the changes in public opinion could be viewed.  This does not, however, 
have any direct impact on altering American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union.  
Thus, for Chapter One, it can be concluded that both the Krebs-Jackson formula and 




CHAPTER TWO: RHETORIC OF REVOLUTION: COMPARING 1988 
POLAND WITH 2011 TUNISIA PROTESTS (A BOTTOM-UP CASE STUDY) 
Revolution has been a part of civil society as far back as recorded history will 
allow; citizens become frustrated with the status quo and band together to effect political 
change.  The common cause of grassroots protests manifests itself in the rhetoric the 
groups use to influence their target audience.  Chants, slogans, posters and catch-phrases 
all become fundamental building blocks of protests, and the primary vehicle by which the 
groups deliver their ideology to seemingly errant politicians. 
Though there are hundreds of examples of protests throughout history, the 
protests examined in this study are distinctive in that they were the initial kick-off sites 
for a larger “pan-revolutionary” movement in their respective regions.  In 1988, the 
Polish protests activated a chain of similar protests throughout the satellite countries 
which eventually brought the Soviet Union to its knees.  Twenty-two years later, a group 
of Tunisian protesters sparked a movement which would rip across the Middle East and 
upend the status quo in over a dozen countries.  Rarely in history has such a reactionary 
effect occurred, and even more rarely did the political parties in power go quietly into the 
night.   
Unlike the first Case Study which analyzed the typical top-down relationship of a 
politician attempting to influence his public audience, this second Case Study looks at the 
influential power of rhetoric from the bottom-up.  The driving interest in this case study 
is to determine whether the protesters (C), through their common rhetoric, were able to 





A Brief History of the 1989 Revolutions 
In 1989, the entire world watched in utter astonishment as the Iron Curtain began 
to come down with little warning and little reaction from Communist leadership.  One by 
one, nations under the thumb of the Kremlin gathered their courage and demanded that 
their governments take responsibility for the needs of their people.  In Poland, the 
beginnings of revolution began back in 1980 when Anna Walentynowicz and Lech 
Wałęsa were fired from the V. Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk.  Poland had been wrestling 
with worker’s rights since the end of World War II, and the sacking of Walentynowicz 
and Wałęsa was the final straw.  Standing in unity with their wronged colleagues, the 
entire shipyard went on strike and formed a workers union they called Solidarność, or 
Solidarity.47  Solidarity eventually grew to leverage impressive political power for its 
day, with Lech Wałęsa leading the charge as the symbolic figure, culminating in series of 
widespread strikes in the fall of 1988.  As productivity across the country ground to a 
halt, Communist party leadership agreed to meet with Solidarity for roundtable 
negotiations, a milestone to legitimizing the group within the political sphere.48  The 
negotiations were over by 1989, ending the worker’s strikes, and granting Solidarity and 
other popular groups political power and spots on the ballot in June.  The election was a 
landslide in favor of Solidarity, and one by one pro-Communist politicians were ousted 
from positions of power.  Before the end of 1989, Poland had successfully and peacefully 
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dismantled the Communist government, officially the first to shed their oppressive 
leadership, though by no means the last. 
Similar scenes were played out in nations across Eastern Europe as 1989 drew to 
a close; Hungary was next to shake off their Communist government, followed in quick 
succession by East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania.  In each situation, 
two remarkable things occurred: first, in all but the case of Romania, Communist 
leadership slipped quietly into the background with little to no retaliation toward the 
people – a response no one predicted.  Second and most important for the purposes of this 
essay, the people of each nation emerged from the shadows of their existence and came 
together en masse to protest.  After leading double lives for decades – one for public 
consumption and one for commiserating amongst friends in private – something roused 
the populace enough to convince them that this was the time for action.   
A Brief History of the Arab Spring 
Just over twenty years later, people took to the streets again in droves protesting 
their oppressive governments and calling for change.   This time, the spark to set the fires 
ablaze came from Tunisia – and quite literally.  When Tunisian street vendor Mohamed 
Bouazizi lit himself on fire in protest of the government, smart phones immediately 
notified the world via Tweets, Facebook posts, and photo uploads.  Middle Eastern 
nations latched onto the opportunity and spontaneous protests erupted across the region.  
Citizens of these Arab countries emerged from their shadowed existence – quite similarly 
to the 1989 revolutions – and stood together to face their authoritarian governments.  




disintegrated into violent uproar; military forces were dispatched, citizens were beaten 
down, and some rebellions were crushed before they were able to gain momentum. 
A few of the protests, however, did gain traction.  Groups in Tunisia, Egypt, 
Yemen, Libya and a handful of other countries were persuasive enough to create a 
groundswell of support and eventually topple their respective regimes.  While describing 
the scene in Cairo, Ajami seems to capture the sentiment of the entire revolution: “For 18 
magical days in January and February, Egyptians of all walks of life came together in 
Tahrir Square demanding to be rid of [President Mubarak].”49  For better or for worse, 
citizens across the Middle East came together for a common cause and shared their 
frustrations with their governments and the world. 
Data Utilized 
 Between the 1989 Revolutions and the Arab Spring Protests, there is over 24 
countries’ worth of material to analyze.  To keep the scope of this analysis relatively 
focused, only countries which successfully ousted their existing governments through 
popular protest were selected.  Within the Arab Spring, that includes only four countries: 
Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya.  Matching those four countries to the Communist 
Revolutions, the most relevant corresponding selections were Poland, East Germany, 
Czechoslovakia and Romania.50  To further narrow the scope, this essay compares the 
originating protest in Poland with the originating protest in Tunisia, as the rhetoric 
displayed in these two instances sets the tone for the rest of the countries that follow. 
                                                 
 





The Polish protests occurred without aid from the internet, much less social media 
platforms.  The primary form of communication was via pamphlets, signage, banners, 
and word of mouth.  As word of mouth is not a feasible source of data for this analysis, 
the most logical focus is tangible data such as historical photos and archived pamphlets.  
Some scholarly works also included descriptions of commonly seen slogans, which are 
also included in the data pool. 
 In contrast, gathering data from the Tunisian protests was overwhelming as the 
event took place in full view of the public using the internet and social media platforms.  
There is a great deal of archived material on the internet, so to narrow the scope, focus is 
placed on the four most widely accessible platforms: photos, Facebook, Twitter, and 
blogs.  These data sources provide the best access to firsthand accounts of what was 
happening in real time; photos taken by journalists or protesters in the midst of action, 
Facebook and blog postings by protest leaders, and Tweets from participants in the 
middle of the action.  Though there are a myriad of news and journal articles that also 
cover the protests in great depth, these were excluded those from the dataset as they do 
not provide a snapshot of the raw emotion required for this analysis. 
Factors to Consider 
 As both revolutions took place in non-English speaking countries, the available 
literature is largely not in English.  Wherever possible, native speakers were engaged to 




utilized.51  In some cases, however, the phrases were put into an online translator –
Google Translate – and the subsequent interpretation is what is used for analysis.  The 
automated translations may not be entirely accurate, as is expected of a computerized 
service, though the ‘gist’ of the emotion comes though without hindrance.  It is this ‘gist’ 
that I am seeking to document, so precise translations are rendered unnecessary. 
 Another consideration is the availability of data.  As mentioned before, the 
majority of data for the Polish revolution comes from internet archives and scholarly 
books.  Additional data and archived materials are available at various universities across 
the country, but a lack of resources meant traveling to access the archives was unfeasible.  
In a similar way, Tunisian protest data posed a paradoxical problem: both too much and 
not enough material to analyze.  Though there is a nearly infinite amount of archived data 
through Twitter and Facebook, the sheer volume makes it impossible to sort and 
accurately analyze the data.  To remedy this situation, the top-recommended Facebook 
and Twitter accounts were skimmed for high-activity around specific events.   This 
presented the best representation from when popular emotion and leadership activism 
were at their peak, and I am confident that the data analysis will not suffer greatly as a 
result. 
 On the other side of the same coin, much of the Arab Spring archived data has 
been made inaccessible by Twitter or Facebook due to their respective privacy policies or 
individual account deactivation; after all, the peak of the Middle East protests occurred 
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almost three years before this essay was written.  Twitter does not permit search by date, 
forcing the user to literally scroll through thousands of tweets by hand, and stops 
allowing access to historical data after a certain point.  Therefore, it was difficult to 
gather much of the Twitter data from December 2010-June 2011 and had to rely on third-
party sources such as Global Voices and Twitoaster.com which archived the information 
on their own sites.  Additionally, many of the Facebook accounts which were active 
during the peak months have either been deactivated or closed by Facebook. 
 As with any other situation played out in public, there are external forces at work 
which help influence O beyond the rhetoric of C.  The role of outside forces impacting 
the position of O in these two samples varies.  In 1989 Poland, O (the Polish 
Government) would have been influenced by grander Soviet political pressures 
attempting to counter the growing anti-Soviet movement among the populace.  Since the 
reach of the media was still restricted in Poland, it is much easier to isolate the Solidarity 
protest movement as a compelling force.  In Tunisia, however, the entire protest 
movement was played out in the media and over the internet.  Not only could anyone 
with internet access voice an opinion about what the Tunisian government should or 
should not do, but Western governments were also conspicuously involved in pressuring 
the regime through more official channels.  It is virtually impossible to isolate the impact 
of Tunisian protest rhetoric when working with open-source material; however, the 
presumption in this case is that Tunisia, being the first of the Arab Spring movements, 
initiated the subsequent chain of events with the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi.  
As a result, the events in Tunisia were driven by that first act and not by other precedent, 




influencers – still waiting with baited breath as the unbelievable story unfolded – took 
their cues from the protesters.    
Part A: The Polish Protests, 1988  
The political union Solidarity was a driving force during the Polish revolution.  
Therefore, a vast majority of the signs and pamphlets from that time were either 
sponsored by or referenced Solidarity in some way – both in the sense of the group’s 
name as well as the sentiment.  Common rhetorical themes included unity, helping one 
another, and general references to freedom and better living standards.  The majority of 
the posters read more like political campaigns than anti-government propaganda.  For 
example, one poster gives a date and time for a political rally with the words “Fighting 
Solidarity invites for manifestation [demonstration] under the slogan ‘We Demand Free 
Elections’”, another shows a broken chain link fence and reads “A vote for Solidarity is a 
step toward freedom”, while a number of photos depict protest groups demanding 
“registration of Solidarity without any alteration of the Statute”.52  One photo shows a 
series of graffiti that pleads “Let [there be] free and independent trade unions and world 
peace” or “Justice and equality for the entire nation” or even “Only Solidarity and 
patience”.  Hardly the rhetoric of angry mobs seeking to dismantle their regime! 
As a number of offshoot groups began to emerge from Solidarity, their posters 
still reflected the same style of messaging initiated by the parent.  Fighting Solidarity was 
one such group, whose poster harkens an “independent and democratic Poland”.   There 
are a few examples of when the rhetoric took on a more aggressive tone, which was 
                                                 
 




usually in response to government crackdowns.  For example, one flyer drew on the 
sympathies of protesters for the plight of one Solidarity leader, Jan Rulewski, who had 
recently fallen victim to some military brutality, while some street graffiti reads “We 
Revenge Rulewski”.  But even then, the posters call for additional strikes in response, not 
an armed rebellion, saying “Enough lawlessness!”  This fed directly into the idea of 
‘citizenry’, a common theme which acted in direct opposition to the pure nationalism and 
oppression espoused by the government.  As Timothy Ash explains, “the word most often 
used to describe the people as opposed to the authorities was społeczeństwo, ‘society’”.53   
Perhaps one of the most powerful posters depicts a crowd of people and reads 
“What are we waiting for?” in large letters.  The poster encourages all who view it to take 
a stand for change, telling the reader that “if you would still have it be as it is, you are 
lost”.  The poster depicts “change” as a “friend”, “disagreement” as a “partner”, and 
insists that “you have to create something from nothing”.  It ends with “what you have, 
you will waive [surrender], and YOU WILL TAKE WHAT HAS BEEN DENIED TO 
YOU”.  The tone of this poster is clearly insubordinate, and encourages taking a stand 
against the current situation, suggesting that anyone satisfied with their lot in life are 
“lost”.  The language used, though, is not necessarily angry; by depicting “change” and 
“disagreements” as “friends” and “partners”, the tone suggests challenging the status quo 
using non-violent, diplomatic means.   
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Oftentimes, Solidarity would distribute their message through poems, or ballads 
which workers would sing with one another.  One of the most well-known is the Ballad 
of the Striking Miners which depicts the feelings of miners sitting around during one of 
their many strikes.  A portion of the translated poem reads: 
“The coal just lays there; No one is mining it 
Laying in huge piles; Nobody is loading it 
There are no ministers; There are no generals 
All of Poland is waiting; waiting for news from us 
The newspapers deceives; The radio deceives 
Tell us today, tell us now; What is wrong in Poland”54 
 
The sentiment from this poem portrays the confusion and helplessness of the Polish 
people, and lets them know that they are not alone in their feeling.  This served as a 
successful tactic for encouraging citizens to have courage in the fight against Communist 
oppression.  It also fed directly into the theme of unity which Solidarity was toiling to 
build in Poland, confirming that the people were correct to be suspicious of the 
government and to trust no one but each other.  For a people who for so long had lived 
their lives in relative solitude to escape the prying eyes of the Kremlin, an outward 
display of unity was difficult to grasp.  Of course, it was also critical in order for the work 
of Solidarity to gain traction and make progress in Poland. 
Another group that was instrumental in creating a sense of unity was the Polish 
Catholic Church.  Despite some ideological discrepancies, Solidarity and the Church 
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were natural allies as both were marginalized groups in the eyes of the Communist party.  
The church contributed to Solidarity’s efforts in a myriad of ways, from providing 
accommodations for traveling leaders to using the pulpit as a platform for distributing 
political information.  In addition, the church was the one place that citizens could gather 
en mass without raising too many alarms.  Despite this deep involvement, the evidence 
does not show religious rhetoric being used during the protests.  The examples of rhetoric 
listed above are all secular in nature. 
It is clear from the posters that the main goal of Solidarity and its splinter groups 
was not violent overthrow.  Throughout the samples, there is repetition of words like 
“independent”, “justice”, “equality”, “trade unions”, and “strike”, which carry tones of 
hope and firm beliefs.  The rhetoric is unyielding, determined, and insistent, but it does 
not advocate for mass devastation in pursuit of the goal.  In fact, the stated goal in most 
cases is not even to rid Poland of Communism – it is simply to have Solidarity 
recognized as a legitimate player in Polish politics.  In many cases, the language even 
carries hints of sadness and exhaustion, such as “deception” or “waiting”, reflecting the 
mood of the Polish people and their desire for change. 
Perhaps what is most interesting about the Polish protests is how little was 
actually said against the Polish government or the Soviet Union.  Looking at the posters, 
the rhetoric rarely takes on an angry tone.  Almost none of it is directed at the state, and 
Communism is only mentioned overtly once.  The rhetoric sounds like what it was – a 
political campaign for legitimacy from a people who were exhausted from decades of 
economic stagnation.  It was only after the Polish government allowed Solidarity a spot 




Poland.  Peacefully and democratically, the rhetorical campaign of Solidarity was able to 
detach Poland from Moscow. 
Part B: The Tunisian Protests, 2011 
The spark that began the Arab Spring was not entirely dissimilar to the Polish 
protests in that it was driven by economic hardship.  Mohamed Bouazizi set himself 
ablaze on December 17, 2010 after his small vegetable cart was confiscated by local 
authorities, leaving Bouazizi with no employment alternatives.  Unlike the Polish 
protests, though, social media turned Bouazizi into a revolutionary martyr instantly.  
From December 10th until Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (better known 
simply as “Ben Ali”) was deposed from office a mere four weeks later, the Tunisian 
Revolution burned bright, hot, and incredibly quickly. 
Shortly after Bouazizi self-immolated, Time Magazine recorded sentiments from 
people around Bouazizi’s hometown of Sidi Bou Zid; one man said “We were silent 
before but Mohammed showed us that we must react," while another explained “We are 
here because we want our dignity. We don't want to have to rely on political favors or 
bribes to get jobs; we need to clean out the system."55  The article also describes a group 
of young male protesters carrying signs that read “We are all prepared to sacrifice our 
blood for the people”56.  It is clear early on that most of the protesters shared Bouazizi’s 
frustration with the employment situation in Tunisia.  The early rhetoric voices concern 
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with economic disparity, high unemployment, and ultimately the government corruption 
that feeds the unemployment. 
Looking at some of the signs and posters from the protests, it is evident that the 
rhetoric reflects anger and frustration.  Much of the rhetoric is directed at Ben Ali 
personally; one young man holds a sign: “Have you ever seen a president who treats his 
people like idiots!!!” while another sign reads “You killed your people Ben Ali”.  A 
phrase commonly seen again and again is the French phrase “Ben Ali Dégage” or “RCD 
Dégage” which means “Ben Ali Out” or “RCD Out”.57  One woman holds a sign calling 
Ben Ali a “liar”.  Other rhetoric simply conveys the general sentiment about life in 
Tunisia.  There is a photo of students in a schoolyard, spelling out the Arabic phrase “No 
to Murder” with their bodies, while another group of protesters holds a sign reading “Halt 
the Repression in the Maghreb!”58 
While there were street protests almost daily, the majority of rhetoric was 
conveyed over the internet using platforms like Facebook or Twitter to rapidly spread 
messaging.  Hundreds of people would tweet their feelings about what was happening in 
Tunisia, and the volume of Facebook and Twitter data available is almost impossible to 
analyze.  By skimming the data, however, one can get a general sense of rhetorical trends 
that occurred.  First, despite every user having the ability to broadcast his or her own 
thoughts, there are some users who quickly become influential and rise up as leaders.  
These users often tweeted or posted a message which was then re-tweeted or “liked” by 
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anywhere from dozens to hundreds of their followers, meaning that the vast majority of 
the internet was simply rehashing the same rhetoric over and over again.  One example 
occurred on January 1, 2011 when user @TunisieLeveToi tweeted “La REVOLUTION 
DES JASMINS, tous UN RUBAN BLANC, il nous faut un symbole. Faites passez ! 
#Tunisia #SidiBouzid” [Translated: The JASMINE REVOLUTION, all A WHITE 
RIBBON, we need a symbol.  Let’s go!  #Tunisia #SidiBouzid].  The call for a unifying 
symbol was then retweeted over and over again, though it is unclear if this was ever 
adopted as a unifying slogan.59 
Second, these leaders were able to unify the masses using Twitter hashtags.60  
There is a sense of unity that helps gather people together for mass protests and acts as 
the glue to bring the various ideological factions together; The hashtags ‘#sidibouzid’ and 
‘#Tunisia’ quickly became the most utilized terms in the revolution, and were popular 
ways for citizens, journalists, ex-patriots, and activists to transmit their thoughts to 
anyone following those hashtags.  ‘#Sidibouzid’ alone received approximately 79,166 
tweets, according to one archive, while a different analysis put the hashtag at no fewer 
than 103,000 tweets.61 
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There was also unification in another sense.  The term “solidarity” appears a 
number of times in Tunisian protest rhetoric.  One Facebook post from the Tunisian 
political blog Nawaat jokingly said “[Ben Ali] created the National Solidarity fund…he 
took the cash and left us SOLIDARITY!”62  Another Twitter leader @Gamaleid rallied 
their followers by pleading “…emphasize the demonstration of solidarity with the 
Tunisian people tomorrow…”63  It is unclear during this time period whether this was 
meant to be an homage to the Polish protest group, or simply a coincidental phrase to stir 
unity among the protesters. 
Though the protesters may have been unified in spirit, they were certainly not 
unified in messaging.  After reading through all the tweets and Facebook posts and blogs, 
it becomes very difficult to pick out any kind of common frame among all the noise.  The 
sheer volume of information being flung around the ether begins to cancel itself out and 
the intended effect is lost.  It seems that everyone wants the same outcome – the removal 
of the existing Tunisian government – but each person has their own personal reasons for 
why.  There is little cohesion and therefore a very shaky frame with which to channel the 
rhetoric. 
Despite the chaos emanating from hundreds of official or unofficial sources, the 
collaborating effect was immense.  The Tunisian government heard the message loud and 
clear, and went on the record saying, “The message has been received by the government 
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and all political channels.  With the backing of the president, we have already put in place 
urgent measures and allocated $5bn for the development of various areas.”64  That 
statement was not enough to satiate protesters, though, because President Ben Ali 
resigned from office under duress four days later on January 14, 2011, leaving for exile 
with a promise to hold elections within six months.  
Analysis of Rhetoric 
Similarities 
When one compares the events in Poland with those in Tunisia at face value, it 
would seem that the two have much in common.  Both events feature countries suffering 
from similarly oppressive regimes.  Economic conditions are dismal at best, and societal 
welfare is crumbling, so frustrated groups of people band together and stand up against 
their respective regimes.   
The most notable similarity between the two revolutions is the ideology.  The 
rhetoric from both the Polish and Tunisian protests reflect ideas of societal change and 
new government, though one was disputing the merits of Communism while the other, 
disparaging the heavy hand of dictatorship.  The themes of oppression, economic 
disparity, economic and social freedom, and youthful generations longing for change are 
woven throughout both revolutionary periods, and serve as the foundation for protests.   
Both groups also make use of one “martyr-figure” as a focus point for the larger 
protests.  In Poland, that figure was Solidarity Chairman Lech Wałęsa while in Tunisia, 
                                                 
 





of course, it was Mohamed Bouazizi.  These two men were the “face” of the protests – in 
spirit, if not in body – and both also were the reason the protests began in the first place.  
The similarities, though, essentially end here. 
Differences 
After a closer analysis, there are far more differences between the two political 
movements than similarities despite the fact that the end results were largely the same.  
First and most prominent, the rhetoric in Poland compared to Tunisian protests was 
exceptionally different.  In 1989, the overwhelming message was of hope, solidarity, and 
democracy.  And it was a peaceful, logical message: “Count on Me”, “We Demand 
Registration”, and “Free Elections” represent just some of the popular slogans seen 
repeatedly.  There was no blatant animosity toward the existing leadership in a personal 
sense and the bloody rioting was kept to a minimum.  None of the examples explicitly 
denounce the tenants of Communism or even call for regime change.  They simply wish 
to bring the workers union to the forefront as a player in the existing government, and the 
ensuing economic turmoil caused by the strikes is the means by which that eventually 
happens. 
In Tunisia, however, the tone was much more aggressive.  Though Tunisia’s 
protests began as a reaction to economic injustices, the lack of unifying force meant that 
the messaging quickly spun out of control and was based primarily on emotional 
reactions as opposed to pragmatic justification.  Much of the rhetoric is directed toward 
one singular leader rather than the government as a whole: “Ben Ali Out” and “You 
killed your people Ben Ali” were just two examples.  And rather than calling for change 




government did not respond kindly to the angry mob and hundreds of people were injured 
or killed during the protests.  Emotional rhetoric led to angry rebellion; angry rebellion 
begat a vicious cycle of violence which remains problematic to this day.   
Another major difference lies in how the messaging was conveyed during the 
protest periods.  Obviously modern technology was not available in 1989, meaning 
messaging was relegated to posters, newspapers, and pamphlets.  Information was 
disseminated a great deal slower than in the modern day, though the benefit lay in how 
the message was shaped.  Putting words to paper requires effort and consideration; one 
must carefully consider what to write and how those words might be perceived.  If 
something is hastily written but overruled by one’s peers, the poster can simply be left at 
home, the pamphlet not printed.   
On the other hand, the rise of Twitter as a tool of rebellion was a phenomenon 
witnessed during the Arab Spring.  Paper signs were rendered archaic as protesters could 
tweet their feelings in seconds.  In some respects, Twitter, Facebook, and blogging 
allowed the Tunisian protesters to be connected to the cause in a larger way.   People 
could hop onto their mobile phones or laptops and instantly become a part of history by 
using a hashtag.  Anything they felt could be projected to the world just as fast as they 
could type it.  Of course, this also comes with considerable drawbacks, which were made 
evident.  The instantaneous nature of Twitter meant that raw emotion was flung into the 
ether with little regard for polishing.  This often served to fan the flames of protest and 
encourage others to post similarly provocative things.   
Another curiosity that rose from the Twitter trend was the “Rally ‘round the 




the various factions to a common cause and focus the rhetorical message in order to 
achieve the objective more quickly.  In Poland, the rally point manifested in nationalistic 
sentiment, using the flag as a symbol of unity.  The whole point of the protest was to 
rescue their long-forgotten country from the Communist usurpers who had installed 
themselves a few decades previous.  Tunisia also utilized their national flags as a rally 
point, though the overarching nationalist sentiment was less prominent; rather, people 
used Twitter hashtags as their call to action.   
In truth, the hashtags provided the only source of unification in the protests.  
Unlike Solidarity which drove the messaging, no singular leader ever emerged in the 
Arab Spring in the same way as in Poland.  There was no Solidarity movement to provide 
a source of direction and a common message which everyone could promulgate.   Yet in 
Tunisia, the collective voice of hundreds of participants became the overwhelming factor.  
In the case of Tunisia, the rhetoric was more about quantity than quality.    
Applying the Krebs-Jackson Formula  
 Based on the above rhetorical analysis, it is clear that the protest rhetoric had an 
impact on regime change in both 1988 and 2011; the question is to what extent.  At first 
glance, the Polish protests seem to be a mission to oust the communist regime.  After 
closer analysis, though, the protesters are really only calling for the inclusion of 
Solidarity.  Solidarity and the protesters (C), argue that the Polish government (O) has 
been negligent in representing the voice of the people.  The implication, then, is that the 
Polish government must allow Solidarity a seat on the ballot for upcoming elections.  
 The Polish government does indeed accept the implications of the argument and 




outcome.  The question is whether or not the Polish government accepted the frame that 
they were negligent in their representation of Polish citizens.  It is difficult to know what 
was in the minds of the Polish government, but one recollection from Lech Wałęsa’s 
firsthand account of one 1989 roundtable negotiation session provides some insight.  At 
the close of an early April session, Minister of Internal Affairs Czesław Kiszczak 
addressed the cameras: 
We have completed a truly collaborative piece of work.  The 
experience was shared, and so should be the satisfaction.  
Speculation about who won and by how much, or who lost and by 
how much, is unproductive.  There’s been only one victor: our 
homeland…We have not worked in a vacuum nor behind closed 
doors.  We have sought advice from society at large, we have 
listened to the voices of public opinion, we have read letters and 
telegrams from around the country.  The future will reveal the 
practical, concrete results that come of these discussions.  One 
thing is certain:  they have already created precious political and 
moral capital, and have demonstrated once again that when 
confronted with serious problems, when their homeland needs 
them, Poles are able to rise above their divisions, their differences, 
and their prejudices.65  
 
From the Minister’s words, it would appear that the government had 
heeded the protesters and realized that something had to give.  Using this example 
as a gauge, it can be presumed that the Polish government did indeed realize that 
there had been some degree of neglect which roused the public to such fervent 
protests.  By this metric, it is safe to say that Case 1 is the outcome of the Polish 
Solidarity movement.   
                                                 
 





The next step is to determine the outcome of the Tunisian protests.  The lack of 
leadership and common rhetoric in Tunisia makes it very difficult to pinpoint the 
message “C” was trying to convey, (in fact, the analysis suggests that the protesters 
themselves were not entirely clear on their message either) which makes the Krebs-
Jackson Formula all the more useful.  After the analysis sorts through all the noise, the 
common frame that emerges is that Ben Ali’s regime (O) has been an oppressive force in 
Tunisia that is harmful to both person and economy.  The implications, therefore, are that 
Ben Ali must go and a new government more focused on the needs of the people must be 
elected.  Ben Ali was eventually forced to relinquish his post, fleeing into exile, and 




Table 5: Possible Results of Polish Protests 
 Accept Frame Reject Frame 
Accept Implications 
Case 1: Policy Change 
 
The Polish government 
accepts that they have been 
negligent and allow Solidarity 
a space on the ballot 
 
Case 2: Mixed 
 
The Polish government does 
not accept that they have been 
negligent, but allow Solidarity 
a space on the ballot 
 
Reject Implications 
Case 3: Implication Contest 
 
The Polish government 
accepts that they have been 
negligent but do not allow 
Solidarity a space on the ballot 
 
Case 4: Framing Contest 
 
The Polish government does 
not accept that they have been 
negligent and do not allow 





In this case, it is difficult to say exactly which model best fits.  Ben Ali’s regime 
acknowledged that there were problems with the government, and were willing to 
concede to the demands of the protest groups.  This rules out Case 2 and Case 4 since the 
Ben Ali regime accepted the frame.  Originally, though, the government seemed to 
indicate that they would rather try to solve the problems with the existing government 
rather than allow a new government to form; this would mean that Case 3 is the outcome.  
Ben Ali was forced into exile before he could make good on his promise, which brought 
about instant regime change.  Ultimately, there was complete policy change – for better 
or for worse – in Tunisia; since it was not due to the acquiescence of (O), however, this 
outcome is not counted as the result of protest rhetoric. 
 
 This case study is particularly fascinating since two similar circumstances with 
similar endings had different outcomes in the formula.  The utility of the formula is 
proven as a way to dissect various scenarios and get to the root of how rhetoric actually 
impacts the intended audience.  
Table 6: Possible Results of Tunisian Protests 
 Accept Frame Reject Frame 
Accept Implications 
Case 1: Policy Change 
 
Ben Ali’s regime admits that 
they have been oppressive and 
Ben Ali allows a new 
government to form. 
 
Case 2: Mixed 
 
Ben Ali’s regime does not 
believe that they have been 
oppressive, but still allows a 
new government to form. 
 
Reject Implications 
Case 3: Implication Contest 
 
Ben Ali’s regime admits that 
they have been oppressive, but 
does not allow a new 
government to form. 
 
Case 4: Framing Contest 
 
Ben Ali’s regime does not 
believe that they have been 
oppressive, and does not allow 





 In this example of a Bottom-Up scenario, two seemingly similar historical events 
are compared.  The Polish revolutionaries of 1989 used particular rhetoric in order to 
persuade their Soviet-sympathizing government to accept the claim that Polish leadership 
had been negligent in their duty to the people of Poland.  This is held in stark contrast to 
the Tunisian protesters in 2011, who attempted to employ rhetoric to unseat the alleged 
oppressive dictator, Ben Ali. 
 Answering the first question of C’s success over O comes in two parts: in Part A, 
the answer is yes, the protesters (C) employed their rhetoric strategically to force the 
Polish government (O) into acquiescence.  Their rhetoric was unified under the Solidarity 
movement, generally non-aggressive, and effective against a government that was 
quickly losing legitimacy in the eyes of the public.  Part B, though, proves what happens 
when the rhetoric is not applied within the context of a coordinated frame.  The Tunisian 
protesters did not have the same kind of leadership that Solidarity provided, and resulted 
in rhetoric that was sporadic, reactive, and often provoked violence.  In Part B, the 
overall success of C against O is less easily discerned, as Ben Ali chose to resign before 
any real political change could occur. 
 It is evident that the Krebs-Jackson formula is very useful in analyzing a Bottom-
Up scenario, to answer the second question.  Citizen Claimants demanding policy change 
from Political Opponents is a common occurrence, and one which fits into the confines of 
the formula easily since in this scenario, O must be appropriately swayed in order to 
submit to C’s demands.  The formula allows us to categorize the frames and implications 




rhetoric C employs.  For Chapter Two, it can be concluded that despite the varied success 





CHAPTER THREE: RHETORIC OF THE RUN-UP: PRELUDE TO THE 2008 
RUSSIA-GEORGIA WAR (A PEER-TO-PEER CASE STUDY) 
Since the beginning of recorded history, countries have been threatening to go to 
war with each other.  In some cases those threats turn out to be legitimate, though much 
of the time the posturing and beating of chests is all for show.  In the case of Russia and 
Georgia, the two countries have been locked in a precarious chess match for the better 
part of two centuries.  Subtle and not-so-subtle messages are frequently batted across 
borders in order to make a point, yet rarely do the two actually come to blows.  In 2008 
however, the limits were tested and Russia eventually invaded the autonomous regions of 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, land claimed as Georgian territory, resulting in a brief but 
intense war. 
The final case study in this thesis analyzes the “rhetoric of the run-up” between 
Georgia and Russia in the months leading up to violence in 2008.  Unlike the first two 
case studies, this case applies the Krebs-Jackson formula to rhetoric flung between 
governments, where the claimant (C) is Georgia, the opposition (O) is Russia, and the 
Western world serves as the Public (P).  This case study is particularly interesting 
because of the important role played by ‘P’.   
The relationship between Russia and its former satellite nations has been 
precarious since the Soviet Union broke apart in the late 1980s.  Georgia’s visible shift to 
the Western world only adds to the provocation felt in Moscow, and exponentially 
increases the tension between the two countries.  Historically, Georgia has always hoped 
the West would come to Georgia’s aid if Russia were to exercise any force in the region.  




the minds of ‘O’ with regard to Russia’s policy in the Autonomous territories, but also 
influence ‘P’ to provide a mitigating element.      
Timeline of the Conflict 
History of the Autonomous Territories 
The argument over South Ossetia and Abkhazia goes back to the days of the 
former Soviet Union, when both territories were independent ethnic oblasts (regions) that 
were loosely connected to the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR).  The 
autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia comprised approximately 22 percent 
of the Georgian SSR, however due to their historical independence, the populations of 
both territories identified themselves as Abkhazian and Ossetian first, not ethnic 
Georgian.  The Georgians, though, very much considered South Ossetia and Abkhazia as 
part of their legitimate territory, and, according to the report issued by the Independent 
International Fact-Finding Mission (The Mission) on the Conflict in Georgia, the 
Georgian elite were “convinced that these entities had been created by the Soviet 
(Russian) central power to limit Georgian jurisdiction over its own territory.”66   
After the Soviet Union dissolved, Georgian nationalists proclaimed independence 
in 1991 and often used very ethno-centrist slogans which psychologically excluded the 
Abkhazian and Ossetian territories from the new independent Georgia.  Meanwhile, 
Russia was seeking to reclaim control over its newly lost Republics and picked up 
support wherever it could be found.  Not surprisingly, Abkhazia and South Ossetia were 
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feeling rather isolated from Georgia and began to align with Russian ideology.  Forces 
from the Russian Federation began to intervene in conflicts between Georgia and the 
territories, fighting on the side of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.67  One of the more 
significant conflicts occurred in 1991 between Georgia and South Ossetia, followed 
almost immediately by a second war between Georgia and Abkhazia in 1992.  In June 
1992, new Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze agreed to a cease-fire brokered by 
the Russians; as a result, “Russian, Georgian, and Ossetian ‘peacekeeping’ units set up 
base camps in a security zone around Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia”.68 
The presence of Russian troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia has swayed public 
opinion in those regions in favor of Russia.  However, Mikheil Saakashvili, elected 
President of Georgia in 2004, was decidedly anti-Russian in his ideology and was wary 
of the Russian presence and influence occupying what is legally Georgian territory.  In 
fact, “under the leadership of Vladimir Putin and Mikheil Saakashvili, bilateral relations 
became the most precarious ever between the Russian Federation and a neighboring state 
formerly belonging to the USSR.”69  Saakashvili “reportedly sent several hundred police, 
military, and intelligence personnel into South Ossetia” under the pretense of bolstering 
its peacekeeping force in accordance with the guidelines set by the Sochi Agreements of 
1992.70 
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In 2005, Saakashvili attempted to placate South Ossetia with a new peace plan.  
The plan included “substantial autonomy and a three-stage settlement, consisting of 
demilitarization, economic rehabilitation, and a political settlement”.  However, South 
Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoiti rejected the plan outright, asserting that “we [South 
Ossetians] are citizens of Russia”71.  It would seem that the stage was set for conflict. 
The 2008 Russia-Georgia War 
When the war kicked off in August 2008, the outside world was simultaneously 
surprised and unsurprised. As Brian Ellison notes, “There is some debate as to how the 
conflict began. Few now doubt that Georgia was responsible for actually initiating the 
war by attacking the city of Tskhinvali on the evening of August 7—but Russian 
presence in the region is thought to be at least a partial catalyst.”72 
In the report submitted by The Mission, all sides of the conflict – to include 
Russia, Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia – were asked to submit their version of 
events for consideration.  Georgia claims that Russia launched “an egregious breach of 
Georgia’s political sovereignty and territorial integrity” when they sent mass troops into 
South Ossetia.73  From the Russian angle, “the treacherous attack launched by Georgia 
against the peaceful population of South Ossetia and the Russian 
peacekeepers…demonstrated aggressive intent on the part of the Georgian side”.74  This 
                                                 
 
71 Library of Congress, Russia-Georgia Conflict (2009), 3. 
72 Brian Ellison, "Russian Grand Strategy in the South Ossetia War." Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of 
Post-Soviet Democratization 19 (2011): 343. 
73 Council of the European Union, Volume II (2009): 186. 




meant the Russians had no choice but to defend its peacekeepers and strike back against 
Georgian aggression. 
Data Utilized 
 For this case study, the intent was to analyze rhetoric originating from heads of 
state in both Russia and Georgia.  Wherever possible, firsthand accounts directly from the 
archives of Government Ministries (Ministry of Defense, Foreign Ministry, Office of the 
President, etc.) are used.  Official statements from the various ministries are not included 
in the analysis, as they represent a collective sentiment rather than the words of one 
particular individual.  Since the conflict has arguably been ongoing since the early 20th 
century, narrowing the timeframe was important to gathering the most pertinent and 
pointed rhetoric applicable to the mounting tensions; therefore, analysis begins in January 
2008 and ends on 7 August 2008, just before the Georgians fired shots at the Russian 
peacekeeping forces. 
Since the public also plays a critical role, finding accounts of speeches or remarks 
that appeared in widely-accessible settings – such as national speeches, remarks given at 
public events, or newspaper interviews – was central to the overall analysis.  In the 
instances when information came from quotes found in news articles, no journalistic 
interpretation was applied – strictly the verbatim quote from the government official. 
 This case study was different in that there was an actual dialogue played out 
before the public between the two opposing parties.  In the first two case studies, the 
rhetoric from ‘C’ was almost entirely one sided; a verdict from ‘O’ was not fully 
established until the end of the case study, whereas with this case study, ‘C’ and ‘O’ are 




instances, the two leaders are even in the same room together.  This provides an 
interesting dynamic which will develop further in the analysis. 
Much like Case Study 1, the various speeches were combed for rhetoric which 
was intended for either the opposition or public consumption, and each instance was 
color coded based on the sentiment evoked by each passage (red for aggressive/negative, 
green for sentimental/positive, orange for neutral).   
 
Factors to Consider 
 The history of Russia-Georgia relations goes back centuries and is interspersed 
with periods of both harmony and hostility.  In recent decades, the influence of the West 
has added a third dynamic to the precarious relationship in varying attempts to curtail 
Russia’s grasp on the region.  Naturally, when any kind of trouble begins to brew in the 
Caucasus region, the entire world attempts to weigh in and convince Russian leadership 
to stand down.  When conducting this Case Study, the influence of the West cannot be 
overlooked.  Any result is likely due in part to behind-the-scenes diplomacy and 
backchannel negotiations orchestrated with great delicacy.  However, as with the Case 
Table 7: Number of Positive, Negative, and Neutral References from Georgian 
and Russian speeches (January – July 2008) 
GEORGIA Feb Mar Apr May Jun July  
Positive 13 3 63 8 2 17  
Negative 4 7 71 31 7 28  
Neutral 0 0 0 1 0 0  
               
RUSSIA Feb Mar Apr May Jun July  
Positive 14 1 8 0 23 0  
Negative 1 10 0 0 1 0  
Neutral 0 0 0 0 0 0  




Study in Chapter Two, it is impossible to know and account for these cloaked 
interactions.  Therefore, this Case Study is only interested in the reactions that are given 
in response to public remarks. 
 It is also important to note that this Case Study involves the particular 
personalities of the leaders more directly than the previous Case Studies.  Russia’s 
Vladimir Putin is a force of nature, a shrewd politician and former espionage master who 
is known to “play the long game” when it comes to geopolitics.  This is contrasted 
sharply by Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia, a young, fiery, and volatile leader lacking 
both the political acumen and the patience of his Russian counterpart.  Their respective 
personalities and leadership styles directly influence the type of rhetoric lobbed across 
their shared border, as well as any response (or lack thereof).    
February – March 2008 
When speaking to the world about the actions of the Russians, Georgia certainly 
felt no need to hold back.  As evidenced in Table 7 above, the rhetoric coming from the 
Georgian side was generally negative, with only one instance where a remark could be 
perceived as neutral. 
 There was no data available for the entire month of January; that is to say, 
searching through the archives resulted in no transcripts or news articles that featured 
direct quotes from the Georgian Prime Minister or President regarding the situation in the 
autonomous territories.  Thus, the analysis begins in February with an article from 
Civil.ge and an account of a meeting between Mr. Saakashvili and Mr. Putin. When 
speaking to his home country newspaper, Saakashvili naturally uses very aggressive 




the Russians.  Terms like “manipulation” and “serious and dangerous” were used, as well 
as the phrase “do not play with fire”75.  When speaking in an official state capacity, 
however, Saakashvili completely kowtows to Putin and does not use rhetoric that could 
possibly be misconstrued as improper or hostile. 
 Russian rhetoric is very even-toned at this stage, and some phrases even suggest 
friendship.  Rhetoric in February comes from two state visits with the Georgian head of 
state, and Putin says that “relations are starting to improve” and that he is “pleased to 
hear” that “Georgian leadership seeks better relations with Russia”.  One week later, 
Russian rhetoric is very humble and insistent that “we never shy away” from discussing 
sensitive issues with “partners”.    
 February would be the last time such pristine language was used.  By March, the 
pattern of rhetoric from Georgian leadership was quickly trending toward aggressive, 
with terms like “dangerous”, “illegal”, “self-destruction” being repeated many times.  
When the rhetoric softens, it is usually the Georgian leadership reassuring the Georgian 
people (and presumably the Western world) that Georgia is “calm” and “undefeatable 
when united”.  Likewise, Russian rhetoric takes a turn for the negative when Putin is 
asked about Georgia’s possible entry into the North American Treaty Organization 
(NATO) alliance.  Putin immediately grows defensive, and begins to describe the alliance 
as “unnecessary”, “harmful” and “counterproductive”, as well as increasing the “potential 
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for conflict”.  A few weeks later, Putin voices his concern about the same subject saying 
“we are not happy about the situation” and calling it “troublesome”.  
April – May 2008  
 In April the conflict begins to heat up quickly, and Georgian rhetoric becomes 
even more antagonistic toward the Russians.  On April 20th, Georgia accused the 
Russians of shooting down an unmanned aircraft in Georgian airspace, giving Georgia 
plenty of fuel for a campaign of hostile rhetoric.  The term “unprovoked” is used 
frequently to describe the attack, and the Georgians often project onto Russia the severity 
of their actions, claiming that “this is not only illegal”, but “total craziness”.  On April 
24th, Saakashvili addressed the entire nation in a lengthy speech devoted to cutting down 
the Russians and defending Georgian integrity.  He mentions “worrisome events”, a 
“serious security situation” that “threatens the nation’s security”.  Saakashvili describes 
the Russians as “increasingly provocative”, who through their “act of armed aggression”, 
“attacked and destroyed” Georgian property.  Variations of “aggression” are used three 
times in the speech, and the word “illegal” appears four times.  Even when using 
friendlier terms, Saakashvili still manages to turn Russia into the scapegoat.  Saakashvili 
describes Georgia as “committed to integrity” and “united as Georgians”, “patient and 
steadfast” and “moving toward greater freedom”.  Georgia is obviously painted as a 
victim, while the evil, antagonistic Russia stomps all over the international laws which 
dictate Georgian territory. 
 Russian rhetoric in April starts out very cool.  In stark contrast to Saakashvili’s 
accusations of illegality, Putin insists that Russia is “entirely in the legal domain” and just 




downed aircraft emerges in mid-April.  Rather than lash back at the rhetoric being 
spewed from Tbilisi, however, Russian leadership goes completely silent.  A number of 
statements were put out by either the Russian Foreign Ministry or the Russian Defense 
ministry, and sometimes those statements included references to things that Putin or 
Medvedev had said.  But since there is no direct transcript of remarks available from the 
leadership, these accounts cannot be included in the data set.   
 By May, Saakashvili’s rhetoric has become almost entirely negative in tone, and 
he has essentially given up on the “calmer” Georgia.  An interview with Reuters on May 
1, 2008 recorded Saakashvili as mocking Russia’s fear of the “dangerous virus of 
democracy and freedom” and “perceived threat” of NATO enlargement.  Speeches 
throughout the rest of May are equally hostile, evident by the large amounts of red 
coloring in the coding charts in Appendix D.  He reminds his audience that “this threat 
remains” and things are “still very tense”.  He describes the situation as “very volatile”, 
“extremely unstable” and a “very unclear period”.  Yet despite the “threats of direct 
action” and “further aggression by Russia”, Saakashvili describes Georgia as a 
“moderating force” who would be “crazy to consider a military option”, though he warns 
that “we have decided not to give back Abkhazia” because “that is basically called 
appeasement”.   Putin, in contrast, has gone silent. 
June-July 2008  
 In June and July the pressure begins to boil over.  There is increased use of the 
term “illegal” and Saakashvili calls the Russians “gangs of bandits” three times in one 
speech.  He takes on a tone of incredulity, using phrases like “don’t recall anything as 




things”.   There is much repetition of the terms “blatant”, “unprecedented”, “illegal”, and 
“surprise”.  At the same time, keeping with the theme of Georgia as a victim, he insists 
that Georgia “cannot fight with Russia”, and are “willing to work closely” with Russia 
for peace.  He describes Georgia as a “small country” with “morality” and “strong 
emotional, cultural, and historic ties”, clearly trying to point the public – and the Kremlin 
– to the fact that meek Georgia is being bullied. 
 Putin does not make any public remarks in June; rather, Russian President Dimitri 
Medvedev makes public remarks on two occasions that can be included into the dataset.  
On June 21st, Medvedev is at St. Petersburg University speaking with students.  During 
the question and answer session, one student asks outright about the recent provocative 
acts on the border.  Medvedev responds that Russia is a “peace-loving” country, bound to 
Georgia through “historical, cultural, and state ties”.  He describes Georgia as “a country 
very close to us” with “differences of opinion” that can be settled through “bilateral 
negotiation”.  Medvedev mentions the idea of peaceful discussion a few times, indicating 
that Russia is willing to negotiate with “appropriate representatives”.  He refers to the 
Russian “peacekeepers” and their mission “in accordance with an international 
agreement” who operate “worthily and responsibly”.  He concludes by chastising the 
student for drawing “the kinds of conclusions you suggested” about Russia’s intervention 
in the region. 
 After July 15th, the leaders from both sides go silent; at least, it was impossible to 
locate sources with direct quotes from either Russian or Georgian heads of state 




because on August 7 2008, Georgian troops fired on Russian troops and the five-day war 
kicked off. 
Analysis of Rhetoric 
This case is particularly interesting for a number of reasons.  First, what was 
originally thought to be a two-sided conversation quickly revealed itself to be largely 
one-sided.  The chart in Appendix F provides a useful visual to compare the incredible 
volume of rhetoric from Georgia compared to Russia.  While the Georgians are 
constantly saturating the public media with their accounting of events, the Russians sit in 
relative silence.   
Second, Georgia proved to be very forthright with their aggressive rhetoric.  In a 
number of instances, Saakashvili does not hesitate to point a finger directly at Moscow, 
citing “Russian aggression” or “Russian support” or even “President Putin”.   Anytime 
there was positive rhetoric, it was only to further support the narrative that Russia was a 
bully trying to push around their former satellite nation, or to paint Georgia as a moderate 
force for good.  Unless the two parties were sharing a microphone in the same room, 
Georgia never spoke kind words of Russia.  It would seem obvious that the Claimant tries 
to push their side of the argument, however by constantly banging the drum of injustice 
and victimization, the rhetoric begins to lose its effectiveness, particularly as Georgia was 
not an entirely innocent party when it came to provocative acts of aggression within the 
Autonomous region itself. 
Finally, it was a bit surprising how the Russians refrained from commenting.  In 
many ways, the lack of rhetoric from the Russians served only to discredit the rhetoric 




moments, and employ primarily positive rhetoric, the Russians painted themselves as 
amenable people caught in a minor disagreement.   
Furthermore, the fact that this exchange transpired on the public stage – 
sometimes alongside of Western representatives – seemed to have no impact on Russia at 
all.  Georgia’s perpetual shrieks of injustice were not enough to persuade the West to 
intervene, nor even enough to rile the Russian bear.  In the end, Georgia’s rhetoric fell on 
deaf ears around the world. 
Applying the Krebs-Jackson Formula 
  Looking at all the available data, we can determine the outcome of Georgia’s 
efforts.   Cases 1 and 3 are automatically ruled out by Russia flatly denying the notion 
that their behavior was overly aggressive or hostile.  Case 2 could have been the outcome 
if the Russians had disagreed that their actions were provocative – only acting out of 
concern for the Russian citizens in the Autonomous Territories – but agreed to remove 
their peacekeeping troops.  However, Russia repeatedly insisted that the peacekeepers 
were in the territories in accordance with the international treaties, and thus they were 
completely legal. 
Therefore, it is clear that the outcome is Case 4: Framing Contest.  For all its 
bravado, the Georgian (C) frame of the Russians as a bully was ignored, their indignation 
drowned by the silence of Russia (O).  Nothing Saakashvili said could persuade Putin to 
accept Georgia’s Implication that Russia needed to stand down, nor was he able to 





  Drawing Conclusions 
This final case study focuses on the Peer-to-Peer scenario, when one Claimant 
politician attempts to force an Opposition politician into a particular frame and 
implications.  As evidenced by the analysis, Georgia’s Mikheil Saakashvili was unable to 
publically force Vladimir Putin into changing Russia’s policy on the autonomous 
territories, which is the answer to the first question of C’s overall success or failure in this 
case.  It is interesting to see that although Saakashvili set forth a clear frame and 
implications, the missing factor was acceptance from the Russians.  This case study 
proves the point that even the most convincing frame and earnest implications may not be 
enough to sway the target audience if the political pressure from C is not viewed as 
‘problematic’ in the first place.  This is in stark contrast to the case study used in the 
original Krebs-Jackson paper, where the Israeli government clearly felt pressured by the 
Druze implying that the Israelis were anything other than ethnically tolerant.  
Table 8: Possible Results of Case Study 3 
 Accept Frame Reject Frame 
Accept Implications 
Case 1: Policy Change 
 
The Russians accept Georgia’s 
claim that the Russians are 
overly aggressive and agree to 
surrender the Autonomous 
Territories. 
 
Case 2: Mixed 
 
The Russians do not accept 
Georgia’s claim that the 
Russians are overly aggressive 




Case 3: Implication Contest 
 
The Russians accept Georgia’s 
claim that the Russians are 
overly aggressive, however 
they do not abandon the 
Autonomous Territories 
 
Case 4: Framing Contest 
 
The Russians do not accept 
Georgia’s claim that the 
Russians are overly aggressive 






Saakashvili’s rhetorical blasts were unable to back Putin and the Russians into the desired 
corner, which is not surprising given Putin’s reputation for stoicism. 
Addressing the second question, this does appear to be an appropriate and useful 
application of the Krebs-Jackson formula.  The public arena is a common forum for 
leaders to play out political disputes while simultaneously garnering support from allies.  
Even when shrouded by cordial overtones, rhetoric directed between leaders carries direct 
implications intended to back the Opposition into a corner and sway opinion toward the 
Claimant.  Depending on the scenario and personalities of the leadership involved, this 
very public display of coercive rhetoric could be enough to force the Opposition into a 






 Political rhetoric is nothing if not calculated.  Politicians and groups seeking 
political change spend a great deal of time attempting to bring their target audience 
around to their point of view; the question is, does all that rhetorical showiness work?  As 
was presented in this essay, the Krebs-Jackson formula is an important tool because it 
helps crystalize what – if any – impact that rhetoric had on forcing policy change in O.  
When trying to analyze the overall impact a Claimant’s rhetoric has on his Opposition, 
there is much that can get lost in translation.  By breaking down the possible outcomes 
into four categories, and viewing the rhetoric in terms of frames and implications, we can 
better organize the chaos and ambiguity of political rhetoric, and assign a more accurate 
outcome. 
Table 9: Summary of Krebs-Jackson Case Study Results 
Case Study Type Outcome 
Appropriate Use 
of Formula? 
1: Rhetoric of Foreign 
Policy 
Top-Down 
Case 3: Implications 
Contest 
No 
2A: Rhetoric of Protest 
(Poland) 
Bottom-Up Case 1: Policy Change Yes 
2B: Rhetoric of Protest 
(Tunisia) 
Bottom-Up 
Case 3: Implications 
Contest 
Yes 
3: Rhetoric of the Run Up Peer-to-Peer 




In Chapter One, the formula is useful in discerning exactly what the polling data 
told us about American public opinion toward the Soviet Union.  Public opinion ebbed 
and flowed so often that it was easy to lose sight of the bigger picture.  The Krebs-
Jackson formula revealed that ultimately, the American public agreed with President 




they were hesitant to accept the implication that the United States would enter into a new 
relationship with the Soviets.  In other words, the rhetoric President Reagan used did 
impact the American people, but only to a certain extent.  It was also revealed that this 
type of “Top-Down” scenario may not be the best application of the Krebs-Jackson 
formula, as it ultimately does not matter what the public thinks about any particular 
policy.  Favorable public opinion always makes it much easier for a politician to work 
and unfavorable public opinion can make for a hostile operating environment or even 
ultimately lead to policy reversals.  But if a politician really wants to change policy, the 
public has little control over that in the immediate sense.   
 Chapter Two may have been the most informative of the three. It first revealed 
that collective rhetoric does not necessarily lend itself to an obvious frame.  In Part A, 
Solidarity in Poland, the clear organization and deliberate rhetoric of the campaign had a 
great impact on winning the battle for legitimization with little backlash.  In Part B, 
Tunisia, by contrast, there was a great deal of emotional rhetoric but little by way of 
driving force to unify that rhetoric into a frame.  When the Krebs-Jackson formula was 
applied to Part B, it was difficult to determine exactly what C’s frame was, and thereby 
difficult to determine the ultimate outcome.  This case study also showed that rhetoric 
alone, without the frame and subsequent implications, is just noise. 
 In many ways, Chapter Two was the most similar to the original Krebs-Jackson 
case study in their essay.  This was a “Bottom-Up” case where the citizens used rhetoric 
in the public forum to pressure their governments into policy change.  This is an ideal 




employed.  In Part A, this resulted in a total policy shift, whereas in Part B, the best 
conclusion was an Implications Contest.    
 The final case study in Chapter Three had the clearest outcome, but it also had 
interesting results.  This case study showed that although rhetoric can be forced into a 
frame and subsequent implications, but it may not be enough to turn the tides.  For all of 
Saakashvili’s bravado and banging of the proverbial table, he was unable to achieve the 
desired results with his frame or his implications.  The public played a critical role in this 
case study, but they too were clearly not swayed by the frame by which Saakashvili 
delivered his rhetoric.  However, this is still a relevant application of the formula.  
Governments frequently use the global platform to voice consent or dissent with the 
actions of other governments.  The Krebs-Jackson formula measures whether or not a 
Claimant government’s rhetoric is successful in causing enough public ruckus to force 
the Opposition government into submission. 
Interestingly, Case 2 (Mixed) never appeared as one of the outcomes.  Case 2 is 
probably one of the least likely to occur in modern political situations due to the fact that 
it requires O to disagree with C on principle, but acquiesce to C’s demands anyway.  
Perhaps in other political eras this would have been a more frequent outcome as political 
groups seemingly had a greater tolerance for negation in the pursuit of progress.  Today’s 
political groups rarely compromise principle (whether justified or not).  
 The question still to be answered is whether or not political Claimants seeking 
change should bother with devising great rhetorical arguments in the hope of persuading 
the Opposition over to their side.  Unfortunately, in this essay, the results are 




desired result from the Opposition; one scenario ended in flat out failure, while two more 
were impacted by external factors which meant the model could not form an accurate 
result.  Despite the inconsistency, we can still draw conclusions about the general 
effectiveness of rhetoric from Claimant to Opposition based on the outcomes of each 
Case Study, as listed in Table 10 below.  The Bottom-Up scenario is listed as Most 
Effective as this was the only Case Study which showed moderate success.  The Polish 
Solidarity movement was completely successful in employing persuasive rhetoric over 
their Opposition, and the Tunisian protesters may have been successful if external factors 
had not intervened and essentially halted the model before the full effect of protest 






Top-Down is ranked as Somewhat Effective based on the outcome of Reagan’s 
rhetoric toward the American people.  Reagan experienced some success in garnering a 
reaction from the public, however it is much more difficult to convince an entire 
populace to accept a policy change.  There are too many variables involved with a Top-
Down scenario to draw a definitive conclusion about the effectiveness of C’s rhetoric.  
And finally, Peer-to-Peer is ranked Least Effective scenario for political persuasive 
rhetoric.  In Chapter Three, Saakashvili was wholly unsuccessful in his attempts to 
persuade Putin to rethink Russia’s policy regarding the Autonomous Territories.  Peer-to-
Peer rhetoric is the most difficult to employ as it depends largely on the personalities of 
Table 10: Ranking Effectiveness of Rhetoric by Scenario 
Scenario Ranking 
Bottom-Up (1)    Most Effective 
Top-Down (2)    Somewhat Effective 




the two political entities involved.  As evidenced in the Putin/Saakashvili case, Putin’s 
stoic temperament meant that all the rhetoric in the world from Saakashvili’s could not 
force Putin into any kind of compromise.  Other, weaker politicians may be more easily 
influenced by Claimant rhetoric; however, this could not be tested within the confines of 
this particular essay. 
From these rankings, Political Claimants can assess which scenario they are about 
to enter into, and decide whether or not it is worth spending significant amounts of time 
tailoring rhetoric for the Opposition audience.  Yet it must be re-emphasized, as Krebs 
and Jackson originally told us, that the formula cannot read hearts or minds.  Ultimately, 
the way people respond to rhetoric depends on their own personal interpretation, their 
past experiences, and their perspective on the issue.  Overcoming this bias is nearly 
impossible, but the formula goes a long way in distilling the root of the arguments and 
isolating the audience’s response.  Thus, a politician can estimate the various arguments 
and responses in advance, and possibly tailor his rhetoric so as to have the greatest 





Abdelfattah, Mohamed. 2011. Thank you Tunisia ! Accessed October 18, 2012. 
http://www.anegyptianjournalist.com/archives/130. 
Abouzeid, Rania. 2011. Bouazizi: The Man Who Set Himself on Fire. January 21. 
Accessed October 23, 2012. 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2044723,00.html. 
Ajami, Fouad. 2012. "The Arab Spring at One: A Year of Living Dangerously." Foreign 
Affairs 91 (2): 56-65. 
Aldrich, John H, John L Sullivan, and Eugene Borgida. 1989. "Foreign Affairs and Issue 
Voting: Do Presidential Candidates "Waltz Before a Blind Audience?"." The 
American Political Science Review, March: 123-141. 
Allen, Richard V. 2000. "The Man Who Won the Cold War." The Hoover Digest, 
January 30. Accessed February 22, 2014. 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/7398. 
Anderson, Lisa. 2011. "Demistifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences between 
Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya." Foreign Affairs 2-7. 
Ash, Timothy. 1999. "“The Year of Truth”." In The Revolutions of 1989, by ed. Vladimir 
Tismaneanu, 117. London: Routledge. 
Axford, Barrie. 2011. "Talk About a Revolution: Social Media and the MENA 
Uprisings." Globalizations 8 (5): 681-686. 
Baum, Matthew A and Phillip BK Potter. 2008. "The Relationships Between Mass 
Media, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis." 
Annual Review of Political Science, 39-65. 
Baum, Matthew A. 2004. "Going Private: Public Opinion, Presidential Rhetoric, and the 
Domestic Politics of Audience Costs in US Foreign Policy Crises." Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, October: 603-631. 
Bostdorff, Denise M. 2002. "The Evolution of a Diplomatic Surprise: Richard M. 
Nixon’s Rhetoric on China, 1952–July 15, 1971." Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 31-
56. 
Bradley, Matt. 2010. "Anger on the streets of Cairo." The National. June 14. Accessed 
October 21, 2012. http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/anger-on-
the-streets-of-cairo. 
—. 2012. Anger on the Streets of Cairo. June 4. Accessed October 13, 2012. 
http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/anger-on-the-streets-of-cairo. 
Burnell, Peter and Andrew Reeve. 1984. "Persuasion as a Political Concept." British 




Cappella, Joseph N., and Kathleen Hall Jamieson. 1997. Spiral of Cynicism: The Press 
and the Public Good. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Cobb, Michael D. and James H. Kuklinski. 1997. "Changing Minds: Political Arguments 
and Political Persuasion." American Journal of Political Science 41 (1): 88-121. 
Cohen, Jeffrey E. 1995. "Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda." American 
Journal of Political Science, February: 87-107. 
Council of the European Union. 2009. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission 
on the Conflict in Georgia: Volumes I & II. Investigation, Council of the 
European Union. 
Dorman, William A., and Steven Livingston. 1994. "News and historical content." The 
Media, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War 63-81. 
Druckman, James N. 2001. "The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen 
Competence." Political Behavior 23 (3): 225-256. 
2011. Egypt's protests, told by #Jan25. January 25. Accessed November 6, 2012. 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News/2011/0125/Egypt-s-protests-told-
by-Jan25. 
Ellison, Brian J. 2011. "Russian Grand Strategy in the South Ossetia War." 
Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 19 (4): 343-366. 
Flanagan, Jason C. 2004. "Woodrow Wilson's "Rhetorical Restructuring": The 
Transformation of the American Self and the Construction of the German 
Enemy." Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Summer: 115-148. 
Freelon, Dean. 2012. Arab Spring Twitter data now available (sort of). American 
University School of Communication. February 11. Accessed October 18, 2012. 
http://dfreelon.org/2012/02/11/arab-spring-twitter-data-now-available-sort-of/. 
Gallup Inc. 2011. Gallup Brain. Accessed 2011. 
http://institution.gallup.com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/home.aspx. 
—. 2011. Gallup Brain. Accessed 2011. 
http://www.gallup.com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/poll/1642/Russia.aspx. 
Gamson, William A. 1992. Talking politics. Cambridge University Press. 
Gamson, William A., and Andre Modigliani. 1989. "Media discourse and public opinion 
on nuclear power: A constructionist approach." American journal of sociology 1-
37. 
Gershkoff, Amy, and Shana Kushner. 2005. "Shaping Public Opinion: The 9/11-Iraq 
Connection in the Bush Administration's Rhetoric." Perspectives on Politics, 
September: 525-537. 
Gitlin, Todd. 1980. The whole world is watching: Mass media in the making & unmaking 




2012. Global Voices. Accessed December 9, 2012. http://globalvoicesonline.org/. 
Goffman, Erving. 1974. Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Gregg, Richard B. 1971. "The Ego-Function of the Rhetoric of Protest." Philosophy & 
Rhetoric 4 (2): 71-91. 
Grzegorz, Ekiert, and Jan Kubik. 1999. Rebellious Civil Society: Popular Protest and 
Democratic Consolidation in Poland, 1989-1993. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press. 
Hall, Richard Andrew. 2000. "Theories of Collective Action and Revolution: Evidence 
from the Romanian Transition of December 1989." Europe-Asia Studies 52 (6): 
1069-1093. 
Hall, Wynton C. 2002. "The Invention of 'Quantifiably Safe Rhetoric': Richard Wirthlin 
and Ronald Reagan's Instrumental Use of Public Opinion Research in Presidential 
Discourse." Western Journal of Communication 319-346. 
Haseeb, Khair El‐Din. 2011. "On the Arab ‘Democratic Spring’: Lessons Derived." 
Contemporary Arab Affairs 4 (2): 113-122. 
Hoffmann, Greg. 2005. "Rhetoric of Bush Speeches: Purr Words and Snarl Words." 
ETC: A Review of General Semantics, April: 198-201. 
Iyengar, Shanto. 1991. Is Anyone Responsible?: How Television Frames Political Issues. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Jacobs, L R, and R Y Shapiro. 2000. Politicians don't pander: Political manipulation and 
the loss of democratic responsiveness. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Khatib, Dima. 2011. Dima Khatib's Page. January 25. Accessed October 28, 2012. 
https://twitter.com/Dima_Khatib/status/29973194559463424. 
—. 2011. Sheets of Dima (Translated). July 07. Accessed November 10, 2012. 
http://www.dimakhatib.com/2011/07/maash-nibbouh.html. 
Kinder, Donald R., and Lynn M. Sanders. 1990. "Mimicking political debate with survey 
questions: The case of white opinion on affirmative action for blacks." Social 
cognition 8 (1): 73-103. 
Kiousis, Spiro, and Jesper Strömbäck. 2010. "The White House and public relations: 
Examining the linkage between presidential communications and public opinion." 
Public Relations Review, 7-14. 
Krebs, Ronald R. and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson. 2007. "Twisting Tongues and Twisting 
Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric." European Journal of International 
Relations 13-35. 





Lynch, Mark. 2011. "The Big Think Behind the Arab Spring: Do the Middle East's 
revolutions have a unifying ideology?" Foreign Policy.  
McCarthy, John D, and Mayer Zald. 1977. "Resource Mobilization and Social 
Movements: A Partial Theory." American Journal of Sociology 82 (6): 1212-
1241. 
McCombs, Matthew and Donald L. Shaw. 1972. "The Agenda Setting Function of Mass 
Media." Public Opinion Quarterly 176-187. 
Meyer, David. 2004. "Protest and Political Opportunity." Annual Review of Sociology 30: 
125-145. 
Mueller, John. 1970. "Presidential popularity from Truman to Johnson." The American 
Political Science Review, March: 18-34. 
Mutz, Diana and Joe Soss. 1997. "Reading Public Opinion: The Influence of News 
Coverage on Perceptions of Public Sentiment." Public Opinion Quarterly 431-
451. 
Nelson, Thomas E., and Donald R. Kinder. 1996. "Issue frames and group-centrism in 
American public opinion." The Journal of Politics 58 (4): 1055-1078. 
Nelson, Thomas E., Zoe M. Oxley and Rosalee A. Clawson. 1997. "Toward a 
Psychology of Framing Effects." Political Behavior 19 (3): 221-246. 
Nichol, Jim. 2008. Russia-Georgia Conflict in South Ossetia: Context and Implications 
for U.S. Interests. CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service. 
Accessed September 7, 2013. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a490073.pdf. 
n.d. Open Net. Accessed December 9, 2012. http://opennet.net/research/profiles/yemen. 
Pan, Zhongdang, and Gerald M. Kosicki. 1993. "Framing analysis: An approach to news 
discourse." Political communication 10 (1): 55-75. 
Peters, Gerhard. 1999-2011. The American Presidency Project. Accessed 2011. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/sou.php#axzz1g3R9YuBw. 
Pfau, Michael William. 2007. "Who's Afraid of Fear Appeals: Contingency, Courage, 
and Deliberation in Rhetorical Theory and Practice." Philosophy and Rhetoric, 
216-237. 
Randeree, Bilal. 2011. Tunisia 'to respond' to protests. January 10. Accessed March 14, 
2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/01/20111109030302593.html. 
Rottinghaus, Brandon. 2008. "Presidential Leadership on Foreign Policy, Opinion Polling 
and the Possible Limits of “Crafted Talk”." Political Communication, 138-157. 
Sanders, John T. 1983. "Political Authority." The Monist 66 (4): 545-556. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/27902832. 
Sawani, Youssef Mohamed. 2012. "The ‘end of pan-Arabism’ revisited: Reflections on 




Schattschneider, Elmer E. 1960. The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist’s View of 
Democracy in America. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
Scott, Robert L, and Donald K Smith. 1969. "The Rhetoric of Confrontation." The 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 55 (1): 1-8. 
Searing, Donald. 1995. "The Psychology of Political Authority: A Causal Mechanism of 
Political Learning through Persuasion and Manipulation." Political Psychology 
(International Society of Political Psychology) 16 (4): 677-696. 
Selim. 2010. Carpe Diem. December 29. Accessed November 8, 2012. http://carpediem-
selim.blogspot.com/2010/12/sidibouzid.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medi
um=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+carpediem55+%28Carpe+Diem%29. 
Simons, Herbert W. 1970. "Requirements, Problems, and Strategies: A Theory of 
Persuasion for Social Movements." The Quarterly Journal of Speech 61 (1): 1-11. 
Snow, David, and Robert Benford. 1988. "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant 
Mobilization." International Social Movement Research 1: 197-217. 
Springborg, Robert. 2011. "Whither the Arab Spring? 1989 or 1848?" The International 
Spectator 46 (3): 5-12. 
Tarrow, Sidney. 1994. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
The University of Connecticut. 2011. Roper Center Public Opinion Polling Archives. 
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu.proxy3.library.jhu.edu/. 
The University of Virginia. 2011. The Miller Center Scripps Library Presidential Speech 
Archive. Accessed 2011. http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches. 
Thorne, Vanda. 2011. "Revolution from Below: The Arab Revolts vs. the End of 
Communism." The New Presence 20-26. 
Tilly, Charles. 2004. Social Movements, 1768–2004. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers. 
Tismaneanu, Vladimir, ed. 1999. The Revolutions of 1989. London: Routledge. 
2014. Topsy. Accessed March 2014. https://www.topsy.com. 
n.d. Totally Cool Pix. Accessed October 21, 2012. http://totallycoolpix.com/2011/01/the-
tunisian-revolution/. 
Tsotsis, Alexia. 2011. "A Twitter Snapshot Of The Tunisian Revolution: Over 196K 
Mentions Of Tunisia, Reaching Over 26M Users." Tech Crunch. January 16. 
Accessed October 21, 2012. http://techcrunch.com/2011/01/16/tunisia-2/. 
2011. Tunisia's Nervous Neighbors. January 15. Accessed November 15, 2012. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/video/africa/2011/01/2011115185019277975.html. 
2011. Twitoaster. March 20. Accessed December 9, 2012. http://blog.twitoaster.com/. 




University of Chicago. 2011. National Opinion Research Center (NORC). Accessed 
2011. http://www.norc.org/Pages/default.aspx. 





University of Connecticut. 2011. Roper Center Public Opinion Polling Archives. 
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu.proxy3.library.jhu.edu/. 
University of Virginia. 2011. The Miller Center Scripps Library Presidential Speech 
Archive. Accessed 2011. http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches. 
Unknown. n.d. "Making the History of 1989." George Mason University Roy Rosenzweig 
Center for History and New Media. Accessed December 05, 2012. 
http://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/archive/files/ballad-of-striking-
coalminers_86bbe915ed.pdf. 
—. 2012. We are all Khaled Said. December 2. Accessed October 14, 2012. 
https://www.facebook.com/elshaheeed.co.uk. 
2011. UPDATE 1-Protests erupt in Yemen, president offers reform. January 20. Accessed 
December 9, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/20/yemen-unrest-
idAFLDE70J2BZ20110120. 
Vere, Pete. 2010. From 'Untouchable' to Out of Touch. April 3. Accessed October 3, 
2012. http://catholiclight.stblogs.org/archives/2010/04/anonymous-raise.html. 
Wałęsa, Letch. 1991. The Struggle and the Triumph: An Autobiography. Paris: Editions 
Nathan. 
Yang, Michelle Murray. 2011. "President Nixon’s Speeches and Toasts During His 1972 
Trip to China:A Study in Diplomatic Rhetoric." Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 1-44. 
2011. Year in Review: Hot Topics. December. Accessed November 8, 2012. 
http://yearinreview.twitter.com/en/hottopics.html. 
Young, Garry, and William B. Perkins. 2005. "Presidential rhetoric, the public agenda, 
and the end of presidential television's “golden age"." Journal of Politics 67 (4): 
1190-1205. 
Zald, Mayer N. 1996. "Culture, Ideology, and Strategic Framing." In Comparative 
Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunites, Mobilizing Structures, 
and Cultural Framings, by Doug McAdam, John D McCarthy and Mayer N Zald, 





Appendix A: Public Opinion Polling Data (1982-1988) 







Jan 1980 14 84 Gallup 
Jan 1981 20 77 Gallup 
Jan 1982 23 77 NORC-GSS 
Jan 1983 15 83 Gallup/NORC-GSS Average 
Jan 1985 23 77 NORC-GSS 
Jan 1986 34 66 NORC-GSS 
May 1987 25 71 Times Mirror 
Jan 




















































"What is your opinion of the Soviet Union?"  
Favorable/Unfavorable percent over time and No. of References in 
each SOTU Speech
% Favorable (subtotal) %Unfavorable (subtotal)




Appendix B: State of the Union Speech Coding 
 
1982 1983 
Soviet regime behind 
that military 
dictatorship 
must be a real incentive 
for the Soviets to take 
these talks seriously 
strategy for peace is 
our relationship with 
the Soviet Union 
responsible members 
do not threaten or 
invade neighbors 
forces of oppression 
moderation of Soviet 
power 
change in Soviet 
leadership 
they restrain allies from 
aggression 
working for reduction 
of arms 
of restraint and 
accommodation 
prepared for a positive 
change in relations 
pursuing arms 
reduction negotiations 
far-reaching agenda for 
mutual reduction 
Soviets engaged in an 
unrelenting buildup 
SU must show by deeds 
as well as words 
overwhelming evidence 





sincere commitment to 
respect the rights and 
sovereignty of nations 
  
we negotiate from a 
position of strength 
they respect only 
strength and resolve   
 
we've never needed 








more stable basis for 
peaceful relations with 
the Soviet Union 
People of the Soviet  
committed to seeking 




I want to speak to the 
people of the Soviet 
Union 
Eisenhower, who 
fought by your side in 
WWII 
influenced the Soviet 
Union to return to the 
bargaining table 
with full Cuban-Soviet 
bloc support 
our sons and daughters 
have never fought each 
other in war 
If your government 
wants peace, there will 
be peace 
Soviets will build a 
defense system of their 
own 
provides bases for 
Communist terrorists 
People of the Soviet 
Union 
We can come together 
in faith and friendship 
they already have 
strategic defenses that 
surpass ours 
 
there is only one sane 
policy for your country 
and mine 
build a safer and far 
better world for our 
children and our 
children's children 
  











    
1986 1987 1988 
threat from Soviet 
forces 
Soviets have invested 
$500 billion more on 
their military forces 
when Mr. Gorbachev 
was here 
when Mr. Gorbachev 
was here 
Soviet drive for 
domination 
nearly 1 in 3 Soviet 
families is without 
running hot water 
all Soviet troops are 
removed 
all Soviet troops are 
removed 
increase in espionage 
and state terror 
government still found 
the resources to transfer 
$75 billion in weapons 
to client states 
made my views known 
to Mr. Gorbachev 
made my views known 
to Mr. Gorbachev 
It is my hope that our 
fireside summit in 
Geneva 
can anyone still doubt 
their single-minded 
determination to 
expand their power 
reduce US and Soviet 
long-range missiles 
reduce US and Soviet 
long-range missiles 
Mr. Gorbachev's 
upcoming visit to 
America 
it continues a brutal 
war 
never risk our security 
just for an agreement 
never risk our security 
just for an agreement 
more stable 
relationship 
props up a regime 
whose days are clearly 
numbered 
progress in real respect 
for human rights 
 
openly proclaims and 
practices an alleged 
right to command 
people's lives 
guarantees the rapid 
withdrawal of all Soviet 
troops 
more open contacts 
between our societies 
 
export its ideology by 
force 
they sought to cripple 
our strategic defense 
initiative 
one moment of 
opportunity that the 
Soviets dashed 
 
have made clear that 
Soviet compliance with 
the letter and spirit of 
agreements is essential 
   
If the Soviet 
Government wants an 
agreement, there will be 
such an agreement 












“Count on Me” 
“Justice and Equality 
for the entire nation” 
“Only Solidarity and 
patience” 
“Give us Victory” 
“The strike 
continues” 
“Let live free and independent 












   
  
Poland 
“We ask for registration of 
Solidarity” 
Source: http://cultureofdissent.tumblr.com/#15256074710 
We demand immediate 
registration of NZS without 
changes in the statute 
 
(Note: NZS - Niezależne Zrzeszenie 
Studentów 









“The Communist Party? 
No, thank you” 









  Poland 
WHAT ARE WE WAITING FOR? 
If you would still have to be as it is, you are lost 
Your friend is a change 
The partner of your fight is disagreement. 
You have to do something from nothing, and what 
is powerful should go for nothing 
What you have, you will waive. 
AND YOU WILL TAKE WHAT HAS BEEN 






We are the organization 
“Fighting Solidarity” 
Our motto: "free and solidarity" 
We have grown up with a widespread social and 
liberation movement under "Solidarity" 
We are heading to independent and democratic 
Poland. 






Under the slogan: 
“We Demand Free Elections” 








We Revenge Rulewski 
(Note: Refers to a Polish politician and activist of 
Solidarity, Jan Rulewski. He was assaulted by police 
during the Bydgoszcz events in 1981. 
Provocation! 
On March 19th in the building of 
WRN in Bydgoszcz several hundred 
militiamen assaulted councilors and 
representatives 
of Solidarity 
25 injured –among them are councilors 
Solidarity Trade Union Chairman Jan 
Rulewski 
IN SERIOUS CONDITION 
Solidarity announces readiness to 
strike across the country 


































“Ben Ali Get Out” 











“Ben Ali Get Out” 
“#SidiBouzid Facebook Operation: 
everyone change your status to: Ben Ali 































“Halt the Repression in the Maghreb!” 
“Retweet @chimisensei the Tunisian 
government’s solution for 
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Appendix F: Russian and Georgian Speech Coding 
Georgian Rhetoric 
February 17, 2008 February 21, 2008 March 6, 2008 March 8, 2008 
“Tbilisi Warns of 
‘Dangerous Impasse’ in 
Ties with Russia” 
Civil.ge 
Meeting with President 




“Georgia: Tbilisi starts 





Region Seeks U.N. 
Recognition” 
  NY Sun 
“Saakashvili Calls for 
Unity” 
Civil.ge 
manipulation I am very happy 
any support of 
separatism from a 
neighboring state is 
illegal 
extremely provocative 
and dangerous step 
serious and dangerous 
deadlock 
I did not want to miss 
This is a dangerous 
decision 
I repeat that this is a 
very dangerous move 
do not play with fire I invite you  




should be calm 
 
We would be very 
pleased  
Russia can't recognize 
their independence 
Georgia does not want 
war, Georgia does not 
want violence 
 
We have indeed had 
some good meetings  
provocative, dangerous 
act of Russia's 
 
we are also making 
progress  
Georgia is undefeatable 
when it is united on key 
issues 
 
We simply must 
normalise our relations   
 
Overcome past 





restore positive trend 
  
 
give new impetus to our 
relations   
 
something we all desire 
  
 
hope very much 





April 17, 2008 April 21, 2008 April 22, 2008 April 23, 2008 








“Georgian Leader Says 
He Has `Proof' of 
Russian Attack”  
Bloomberg 
“Georgia Russia 
Tension Escalates over 
Downed Drone” 
New York Times 
‘Russia Wants to Annex 
Abkhazia’ – Saakashvili  
Civil.ge 
it was a provocative 
Russian move 
attacked an unmanned 
Georgian plane  
unprovoked aggression  will summon tomorrow 
Georgia’s peace plan, its 
territorial integrity and 
the inviolability of our 
borders 
Russia carried out this 
aggressive attack  
it no longer recognized 
Georgia’s sovereignty  
Nothing will hamper the 
process of the peaceful 




I hope they realize  
We demand that the 
Russian 
Federation revise all 
those decisions 
  
that this is not only 
illegal 
peaceful unification of 
Georgia   
total craziness 
We are ready to hold 
consultations    
risky for Russia itself 
astonished and anxious  
  
Russia has declared it 
clearly 
we should remain 
patient and resolute   
they in general 
recognize Georgia's 
territorial integrity 
provocative nature of 
Russia’s move    
they do not recognize 
our sovereignty 
   






April 24, 2008 
“Georgia’s Values of Democracy, Freedom and Dignity are Under Attack from Russia: Pres. 
Saakashvili” 






undermine the values of 




to these territories 
reverse Russia’s 
pattern 








cannot be deterred from 
our freedoms 
refuse to move even a 
single inch  
act of armed 
aggression 
sovereign nation 




illegally took off 
will not rule out any 
action  
we are committed to the 
integrity 
ensure our security  attacked and destroyed 
direct and difficult 
conversation with 
President Putin 






he was unable or 
unwilling  
ensure that we all stand 
together 
ensure a peaceful, 
prosperous life  
disturbingly renew a 
pattern  
explain our grave 
concern  
threat to our national unity 
worked to improve our 
relations  
Russian aggression  
review these actions by 
Russia  
remain patient and 
steadfast 
built modern military 
Russian support for 
ethnic cleansing 
protect our sovereignty 
and security 
reflect on the resurrection 
our own country has 
achieved 
strengthened ties with 
NATO 
bombing by Russian 
planes 
Russia’s actions  
moving toward greater 
freedom 
Invited President Putin 
unprovoked, illegal, 
totally unacceptable, 
and dangerous  
enjoy freedom from 
aggression 
join in shared 
determination  
offered new and 
unprecedented peace 
plan 
Russia’s actions have 
now been condemned  
understand what the 
threat is 




blatant and illegal 
provocations 
against our land and 
our people 
guided by a set of clear 
principles 
increasingly 
provocative set of 
actions 
protect Georgia 
our values that are 
under attack 
insist on our territorial 
sovereignty 
part of Georgia’s 
territory 
values that define our 
nation 
exercise our right to 
associate our future 
with the friends and 
partners we choose 
will not accept incursions 
or illegal actions  
   
Russia and her leaders 





April 29, 2008 May 19, 2008 May 26, 2008 
“Saakashvili Calls on 
Abkhazians, Ossetians to 
Jointly Resist External 
Force” 
Civil.ge 
“INTERVIEW: Georgia's Saakashvili-Russia has 
aggressive intent” 
Deutsche Press 
“UN Says Russia 
Downed Georgian Plane, 
Risking Peace” 
Bloomberg 
Georgia is offering you 
peace 
not as dramatic as two 
weeks ago 
we should be crazy to 
consider a military option 
openly and clearly 
pointed out 
extending the hand of 
friendship 
still very tense very unclear period 
it was the Russian 
Federation that shot 
down the drone 
my brothers and sisters 
they will conduct 
military actions 
that this is unacceptable 
further aggression by 
Russia 
one aggressive force 
will counteract NATO 
in the proximity of our 
(Russian) borders 
contrary to international 
law 
 
it can take decisions 
instead of you 
which has nothing to 
do with peacekeeping 
There was ethnic 
cleansing 
 
Living under the reign of 
the separatists 
against the wishes of 
Georgia 
very unconventional 
thing to do 
 
criminal and corrupt groups 
(against) any kind of 
peacekeeping 
agreement 
not something that started 
happening yesterday 
 
large and outrageous force We loudly objected 
a long-standing kind of 
(Russian) policy 
 
It doesn’t care what you 
think 
are threats of direct 
action 
try to solve this conflict 
peacefully 
 
make choices on your 
behalf 
dangerous threats 
We have decided not to 
give back Abkhazia'  
force us to continue 
existing in confrontation 
very volatile situation 
Because that is basically 
called appeasement  




Georgia is being a 
moderating force   
Georgia is offering you 
calm and protection 
   
Georgia is offering you life 
without gangs 
   
our common ill-wisher    
tries to impose on us its 
wicked plans 





June 6, 2008 July 10, 2008 July 11, 2008 
“Saakashvili outlines 
Terms Ahead of Talks 
with Medvedev” 
Civil.ge 
“Russian intimidation at 
new level: Georgian 
leader” 
Reuters UK 
“Sec. Rice With Georgian Pres. Mikheil Saakashvili” 
Scoop.nz 
extend the hand of 
friendship to Russia 
don't recall anything as 
wild as this  
our peace plan for the 
conflicts  
that's what we are  
conditions are very 
clear 
for whom international 
law doesn't mean 
anything any more 
country that also sets 
example 
blatant besiege mentality 
illegally deployed bomb neighboring 
countries at will 
Georgia's territorial 
integrity  
have political dialogue at 
every level 
immediately cease whenever they want to yesterday's incident 
elephant is the actions of 
the Russian Federation  
illegal April 16 
decree 
for God knows what 
reason 
normal air forces don't 
do these kind of things 








not done by very good 
governments  
totally destroying 
use all international 
diplomatic and political 
tools 
Russia no longer 
supports  
don't need repetition of 
bad cases of the past 
Georgia is open Russia keeps surprising but are unprecedented  
certainly reach out to 
every community 
imposed on us 
 
the most blatant 
challenge  
this is about morality 
 
 
Looks like some people 
have not noticed that the 
Cold War is over 
We want to have peace 
 
 
they were bombing us  
we are willing to work 
very closely with Russia 
 
 
We want to find 
equitable solutions 
we have very strong ties 
with Russia 
  
we need peaceful 
solutions 
strong emotional, culture 
and historic ties 
  
we believe in strong 
multicultural, 
multiethnic democracy 
we are a small country 
   





July 12, 2008 July 15, 2008 
“Georgia urges more 
pressure on Russia” 
Financial Times 
“Russia is a menace to 
peace, says Georgia 
leader”  
The London Times 
Georgia alone cannot 
stop this 
situation is precarious 
stronger reaction is 
needed from Europe 
things they (Russia) are 
doing are outrageous 
should be raised to 
the highest level in 
Europe and 
Washington 
killing international law 
 
every day we are 
waking up with some 
surprises 
 







February 21, 2008 February 14, 2008 March 8, 2008 
Beginning of Meeting with 




“Transcript of Annual Big Press 
Conference” 
Kremlin Transcript Archive 
“Press Conference 
following Talks with 
Germany’s Angela Merkel” 
Kremlin Transcript Archive 
thank you for accepting 
our invitation  





the endless expansion of a 
military and political bloc  
our relations are starting to 
improve  
any time that is 
convenient 
same issue in 
different parts of 
the world 
not only unnecessary but 
also harmful and 
counterproductive 
Georgian leadership seeks 
better relations with 
Russia 
And if he accepts 
our invitation 
We are always 
being told  
The impression is that  
we are very pleased to 
hear this 
of course we will 
meet with him 
This is all lies 
hardly likely to agree to 
such a structure  
We will do our best  




this full well 
potential for conflict  
 
As we will this time, 
of course 




and we will most certainly 
accept 
 
Are you Europeans 
not ashamed  
We are proposing 
to our partners   
  








    
March 24, 2008 April 4, 2008 April 22, 2008 June 6, 2008 
“Interview transcript: 
Dmitry Medvedev” 
Financial Times  
“Press Statement and 
Answers to Journalists’ 
Questions Following a 




“Putin to Saakashvili: 
Russia's Abkhazia- and 
South Ossetia-related 
acts are entirely in legal 
domain”  
Regnum 
“Beginning of Meeting 




we are not happy about 
the situation 
We complied in full 
President of Russia 
expressed hope  
we ourselves are capable 
of resolving  
We consider that it is 
extremely troublesome 
Treat us properly and we 
will respond accordingly 
Georgian side would 
also take practical steps 
overcoming the 
difficulties before us  
no state can be pleased 
 
inclusive protection of 
legal interests of 
Russia's citizens  
building relations for the 
long term 
military bloc to which 
it does not belong  
alleviate social burden 
and ensure economic 
development 
What do you think 
coming close to its 
borders  
continue work aimed at 
giving a positive 
impetus   
  
entirely in the legal 
domain   
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Russia is a peace-
loving country 
there can be no 
question  
talks involving Georgia, 
Russia and the 
appropriate 
representatives of the 
territories  
we will not allow such 
behaviour towards 
Russian peacekeepers 
Georgia, like Russia 
Georgia is a country 
very close to us 
This is just what we will 
do 
of course 
We are bound by 
differences of opinion 
between us  
despite all the difficulties 
we face today 
in accordance with an 
international agreement  
 common historical, 
cultural and state ties 
things that we need to 
settle 
we agreed that we will 
continue our contacts 
carrying out their 
mission worthily and 
responsibly 
our relations may not 
be living through the 
best of times 
through bilateral 
negotiations 
We will meet and discuss  
not reason to draw the 
kinds of conclusions 
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